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REVISITING THE HANDMAID’S TALE:
FEMINIST THEORY MEETS EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH ON SURROGATE MOTHERS
Karen Busby and Delaney Vun
Abstract:
After briefly reviewing laws on surrogate
motherhood in Canada, the United States, and Britain, the
authors consider nearly 40 empirical research studies on the
characteristics and experiences of women who have been
surrogate mothers. Empiricism meets feminist theory as we
revisit arguments against surrogacy arrangements, including
the inability to give informed consent, the inherently
exploitative nature of the arrangements, and the dangers of
commodification. In light of our observations based on the
empirical research, we argue that it may be time to review
Canadian surrogacy laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Margaret Atwood’s powerful 1985 novel, The Handmaid’s
Tale, speculates about a near future in Gilead (formerly the
United States), a country ruled by a puritanical theocracy.
Most adults are infertile because of pollution, radiation and
disease. According to the Biblical story, the original Gilead is
the place where, according to the Biblical story, Joseph and the
four women (two wives and two slaves) with whom he had
children settled. Fertile women in the modern Gilead are
forced to be “handmaids”, the term used in one translation to
describe Joseph’s slaves, who had been impregnated by
powerful men. The children of these unions were raised as the
offspring of that man and his wife. Other Biblically-based
Gileadean pro-natalist laws make it a capital offence to engage
in non-reproductive sex or to have an abortion, unless the fetus
evidences a disability. In Atwood’s novel, a handmaid narrates
her story onto audiotapes because women are forbidden to read
or write. Personal voice and oral history have long been used
by marginalized people to make some sense of their
predicament. Many feminist scholars understand The
Handmaid’s Tale to be a novel about the exploitative, dehumanizing elements of surrogate motherhood.1

1

Richard F. Storrow, “The Handmaid’s Tale of Fertility Tourism:
Passports and Third Parties in the Religious Regulation of Assisted
Conception” (2005) 12 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 189, citing, for
example, Helene Michie & Naomi R. Cahn, “Confinements and
Fertility and Infertility in Contemporary Culture” (1997) and Linda
Mysiades, “Law, Medicine, and the Sex Slave in Margaret Atwood’s
The Handmaid’s Tale” in Kostas Myrsiades & Linda Myrsiades, eds.,
Undisciplining Literature: Literature, Law and Culture (New York:
Peter Lang New York, 1999). Storrow’s article also has an interesting
review of Egyptian and Muslim law related to surrogacy
arrangements.
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In early 1986, American Mary Beth Whitehead gave
birth to a child conceived by artificial insemination, using her
egg and the commissioning father’s sperm. She had signed a
surrogacy contract to give up all parental rights and she was to
receive $10,000 as compensation. Shortly after the birth, she
determined that she could not give up the child and a lawsuit,
In the Matter of Baby M,2 ensued between the two genetic
parents. At the trial in 1987, her fitness as a parent was
questioned on rather dubious criteria. Experts criticized her
choice of stuffed teddy bears as toys and how she played “patty
cake” with M. They also stated that she had a narcissistic
personality and used her dyed hair to support their diagnosis.3
The court, after finding that there was a binding contract,
ordered the termination of Whitehead’s parental rights, gave
custody to the commissioning father, and permitted him and his
wife to immediately adopt the child. On appeal in 1988, the
court held the contract was void. The appeal court stated that a
surrogate mother could not give meaningful consent to
relinquish a child until after the child was born and that it is
illegal to pay someone to be a surrogate or to sell a baby.
Therefore, the court rescinded the adoption. Using the “best
interests of the child” test, it held that the commissioning father
should have custody (finding that his home was more stable
2

In the Matter of Baby M. 217 N.J. Super 313 (Ch. Div. 1987) rev’d
109 N.J. 396 (1988).

3

More than 100 prominent feminists, including Betty Freidan, Meryl
Streep, Gloria Steinem and Phyllis Chesler, signed a statement titled
“By these standards we are all unfit mothers”, criticizing the expert
evidence presented on Whitehead’s mothering skills. See also Iver
Peterson, “Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say”,
The New York Times (20 March 1987), online: The New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/20/nyregion/fitness-test-for-babym-s-mother-unfair-feminists-say.html and Phyllis Chesler, The
Sacred Bond: The Legacy of the Baby M Case (New York: Times
Books, 1988).
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and financially secure) and the surrogate mother should have
visitation rights. The Baby M case ignited a firestorm of public
and academic debates on the ethics of commercial surrogacy
arrangements. Feminists were almost uniformly supportive of
the surrogate mother. The Handmaid’s Tale and the Baby M
case both served as influential cautionary tales of women in
imaginary and real regimes that forced them to become, as
described by one of Atwood’s characters, “sacred vessels,
ambulatory chalices”,4 or, in other words, surrogate mothers.
The Canadian government formed the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (“RCNRT”)
in 1989 and reported in 1993. It recommended prohibiting all
surrogacy arrangements on pain of significant criminal
sanctions, asserting that women could not give true consent to
relinquish parental rights and that the practice exploited
vulnerable women and would commodify women and
children.5 The RCNRT’s analysis reflected most popular and
academic feminist thinking in Canada and the United States6 in
4

Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (Toronto: Random House,
1986) at 196.

5

Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed
with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Government
Services Canada, 1993) [RCNRT] at, for example, xxxii, 15, 22, 52,
107, 199, and Recommendations 199-205.

6

Canadian feminists who opposed surrogacy included Christine
Overall, see Human Reproduction: Principles, Practices and Policies
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) [Overall, “Human
Reproduction”] and Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist
Analysis (Allen & Unwin: Boston, 1987) [Overall, “A Feminist
Analysis”]; Somer Brodribb, see “Off the Pedastal and Onto the
Block”, (1986) 1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law/Review
“Femmes et Droit” 407; Michele Landsberg, see “Baby M decision
backing an inhumane practice” Globe and Mail (4 April 1987) A2;
Margrit Eichler, see “Reflections on the ‘Temporary Use of Normally
Functioning Uteri’” in Gwen Basen, Margrit Eichler, & Abby
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the 1980s and early1990s. For example, Christine Overall, an
influential feminist ethicist, questioned whether the choice to
enter a surrogate contract could be a free one and postulated
that it is impossible for a surrogate to be fully informed of the
full potential of the traumas they could experience upon
surrender of the child. She asserted that surrogate mothers
“often have little education, little or no income, and very little
personal security” and are therefore ripe for exploitation. She
described the practice as “reproductive prostitution”7 and stated
that “the argument here is not that selling babies leads, via the
slippery slope, to slavery; the claim is that the practice is
Lippman, eds., Misconceptions: The Social Construction of Choice
and New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies (Hull, Quebec:
Voyaguer, 1993); Diana Majury, see “Pre-Conception Contracts:
Giving the Mother an Option” in Simon Rosenfeld & Peter Findlay,
eds., Debating Canada’s Future: Views from the Left (Toronto:
James Lorimer & Co., 1991); and Susan Sherwin, see “Some
Reflections on ‘Surrogacy’” in Basen, Eichler, & Lippman. American
feminists opposing surrogacy included: Mary Lyndon Shanley, see
“‘Surrogate Mothering’ and Women’s Freedom: A Critique of
Contracts for Human Reproduction” (1993) 18 Signs 618; Martha
Field, see Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Janice Raymond, see
Women As Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle Over
Women’s Freedom (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993); Chesler,
supra note 3; Barbara Katz Rothman, see Recreating Motherhood,
Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1989); Anita L. Allen, see “The Socio-Economic Struggle for
Equality: The Black Surrogate Mother” (1991) Harvard Blackletter J.
17; Gena Corea, see The Mother Machine: Reproductive
Technologies From Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (New
York: Harper & Row, 1985); and see Linda & Whiteford and Mary L.
Poland, eds., New Approaches to Human Reproduction: Social and
Ethical Dimensions (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1989). (Most of
the authors in this text illustrate this point).
7

Overall, “A Feminist Analysis”, supra note 6, at 1 and 116-118.
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slavery” and she concluded that even if a regulatory regime
protects the rights of surrogate mothers it “is incompatible with
the vision of women as equal, autonomous, and valued
members of this culture”.8 Early in the debate, few feminist
voices asserted that women should have the autonomy to make
the choice to be a surrogate mother.9 Once it became apparent
that prohibition coupled with criminal sanctions was the path
likely to be taken in Canada, some noted the dangers of
criminalizing the behaviour of marginalized groups.10
Attitudinal surveys also indicated that there was little
public support for surrogacy in Canada and elsewhere in the
1990s. Vijaya Krishnan’s 1994 survey of more than 5,300
Canadian women of reproductive age found that, while 24
percent of those surveyed approved of commercial surrogacy,
42 percent strongly disapproved. S.J. Genius et al. found in a
1993 survey of 455 Edmontonians that 85 percent were

8

Overall, “Human Reproduction”, supra note 6, at 124 and 131.

9

One early proponent of autonomy and choice was Carmel Shalev, see
Birth Power: The Case for Surrogacy” (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989).

10

The National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), while
stressing that it did not “condone” surrogacy, submitted to a
Parliamentary Committee in April 1997 that criminal approaches
were too heavy handed. See the evidence of Diana Majury and Diana
Ginn, on behalf of NAWL, online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/
35/Archives/committees352/srta/evidence/07_97-04-10/srta07_blk10
1.html>. See also, Majury, supra note 6, Mariana Valverde & Lorna
Weir, “Regulating New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies: A
Feminist View of Recent Canadian Government Initiatives” (1997)
23 Feminist Studies 418, and Alison Harvison Young & Angela
Wasunna, “Wrestling with the Limits of the Law: Regulating New
Reproductive Technologies” (1998) 6 Health Law J. 239.
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opposed to surrogacy if commissioning mothers used surrogacy
simply to avoid the inconvenience of pregnancy.11
Despite the cautionary tales, early feminist thinking
and public opinion and a 2004 criminal law in Canada
prohibiting commercial surrogacy (discussed below), surrogacy
arrangements have persisted as a method of family formation
and seem to be here to stay. Reliable statistics on how many
surrogacy arrangements are entered into are not available, but
the web sites of American and British surrogacy organizations
boast of making hundreds of connections and that at least
25,000 babies have been born to surrogate mothers in the
United States alone.12 The growing reproductive tourism
11

Vajaya Krishnan, “Attitudes toward surrogate motherhood in
Canada” (1994) 15 Health Care for Women International 333 and S.J.
Genius, S.K. Chang, & S.K. Genius, “Public Attitudes in Edmonton
toward assisted human reproduction” (1993) 150 Canadian Medical
Association Journal 701. See also Aimee Poote & Olga van den
Akker, “British women’s attitudes to surrogacy” (2009) 24 Human
Reproduction 139 and G. Wiess, “Public Attitudes about Surrogate
Motherhood” (1992) 6 Michigan Sociological Review 15.

12

For example, Lim Ai Lee, reports that “[a]ccording to reports quoting
industry experts, over 1,000 surrogate births took place in the United
States last year, and it is believed the number has increased since the
recession, as more cash-strapped women turn to surrogacy to ease
their financial burden”: “Surrogacy way to survive the hard times”
The [Malaysia] Star (June 29, 2009), online: Star http://
thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?file=/2009/6/27/columnists/state
side/4187899&sec=stateside. It is not clear whether this figure
include situations where the parties concluded arrangements without
any third party assistance. Elly Teman, acknowledges that accurate
estimates are impossible because so many informal arrangements take
place and she reports that, at least, 25,000 children have been born by
surrogates in the United States: “The Social Construction of
Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the
Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood” (2008) 67
Social Science & Medicine 1104. Childlessness Overcome Through
Surrogacy (COTS) (a British organization celebrated its 600 th birth in
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industry in India is worth more than $450 million (US).13
Hardly a week goes by without the tabloids featuring a
celebrity holding a child borne of a surrogate mother or
television programs about the practice.14 On-line surrogacy
organizations connecting would-be surrogate mothers with
commissioning parents are numerous and ads offering or
seeking commercial surrogacy services are easy-to-find (albeit
now illegal) in Canada.15 Further, the British Medical
2007) reports that most people who enter surrogacy arrangements do
not get legal assistance. In jurisdictions where there are prohibitions
on commercial surrogacy, there is evidence of “do it yourself”
arrangements: COTS online: <http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/About
_COTS.htm>). A 2007 McLean’s Magazine story also evidences a
DIY attitude in Canada. See Jessica Webb, “Gay man seeks perfect
woman: Surrogate mothers find a new niche market: single gay men”
McLeans (May 21, 2007), online: Rogers Digital Media Publishing
<http://www.fertilitylaw.ca/articles/macleans-01.pdf>.
13

Usha Rengachary Smerdon, “Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders:
International Surrogacy Between the United States and India”, (2008)
39 Cumb. L.Rev. 15.

14

For example, in June 2009, People Magazine featured the story
“Sarah Jessica Parker and Matthew Broderick have twins”, online:
<http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20275425,00.html>. The
babies were born “with the generous help of a surrogate”. The TV
series “Lie to Me” repeated “Depraved Heart”, a story about women
who killed herself after giving birth as a surrogate and the BBC aired
the documentary “Addicted to Surrogacy”. Susan Merkens and Tim
Appleton argue that the media portrays surrogacy in a negative light,
see Surrogate Motherhood and the Politics of Reproduction
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) and “Surrogacy”
(2001) II Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynecology 256,
respectively.

15

See Tom Blackwell, “The impotency of Canada’s fertility laws”
National Post (February 13, 2009), online: National Post:
<http://www.nationalpost.com/m/story.html?id=128838> (accessed
July 4, 2009). See CBC, “Paid Surrogacy Driven Underground in
Canada”, online CBC <www.cbc.ca/health/story/2007/05/01/

Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale

21

Association recently changed its position on surrogacy
arrangements. In the mid-1980s it maintained that it was
unethical for a doctor to be involved in surrogacy; by the late
1990s, it accepted it as inevitable 16
The next section of this paper briefly reviews
surrogacy laws in Canada, the United States, and Britain.
These three jurisdictions are the focus of this paper because
commissioning parents in these countries are actively engaged
in making surrogacy arrangements with surrogate mothers,
either within their own countries or in other countries. We then
consider recent research on the characteristics and experiences
of women who have agreed to be surrogates. In this review,
which is the main focus of the paper, empiricism will meet
feminist theory as we revisit arguments against surrogacy,
including the inability to give informed consent, the inherently
exploitative nature of the arrangements and the dangers of
commodification. Anecdotal research, both popular and
theoretical, is available, as is research based on more rigorous
surrogates-pay.html>. See also Shireen Kashmeri, Unravelling
Surrogacy in Ontario, Canada. An Ethnographic Inquiry on the
Influence of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004),
Surrogacy Contracts, Parentage Laws and Gay Fatherhood (M.A.
Thesis, Concordia University Department of Sociology and
Anthropology 2008) [unpublished] at 46. Kashmeri looks at
Canadian lawyers who were informants.
She confirms that
Canadians are traveling to the United States to engage surrogate
mothers and that American commissioning parents will make
arrangements with Canadian surrogates to take advantage of the
Canadian health care system and the lower cost of engaging surrogate
mothers. See also Mary Gazze, “Canada: Destination for Infertile
Couples” Globe & Mail (June 26, 2007), A12.
16

Olga B.A. van den Akker, “Psychosocial aspects of surrogate
motherhood” (2007) 13 Human Reproduction Update 53 [van den
Akker, “Psychosocial aspects”].
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empirical methodologies to study the experiences of surrogate
mothers. As will be described more fully, the “empirical data
[consistently] offers little support for widely expressed
concerns about contractual parenting being emotionally
damaging or exploitative for surrogate mothers, children or
intended/social parents”.17 Vasanti Jadva and her research
team concluded, based on interviews with 34 British women
who have been surrogate mothers, that
Overall, surrogacy appears to be a positive
experience for surrogate mothers. Women who
decide to embark on surrogacy often have
completed a family of their own and feel that
they wish to help a couple who would not
otherwise be able to become parents. The
present study lends little support to the
commonly held expectation that surrogate
mothers will experience psychological problems
following the birth of the child. Instead,
surrogate mothers often reported a feeling of
self-worth.
In addition, surrogate mothers
generally reported positive experiences with the
commissioning couple, and many maintained
contact with them and the child.18
A challenge to the federal Assisted Human
Reproduction Act (“AHRA”) (which prohibits paying a woman
to be a surrogate mother) on federalism grounds was argued
17

Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, “Navigating Rough Waters:
An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy” (2005) 61
Journal of Social Issues 21.

18

Vasanti Jadva, Clare Murray, Emma Lycett, Fiona MacCallum, &
Susan Golombok, “Surrogacy: The Experience of Surrogate Mothers”
(2003) 18 Human Reproduction 2196.
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before the Supreme Court of Canada in April, 2009 (the case
started on reference by the Quebec government, before Quebec
courts and they were joined by the governments of Alberta,
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick before the Supreme Court
of Canada). Both lower courts declared many sections of the
AHRA unconstitutional.19 If the lower court decisions are
upheld, the remaining sections of the AHRA will not make
sense on their own and both the federal government and
provincial governments will need to reconsider surrogacy and
other assisted human reproduction laws. Given this possibility,
and in light of the research on surrogate mothers’ experiences,
it is timely to review Canadian laws relating to surrogacy
arrangements. We will briefly undertake such a review in the
last section of the paper.
In this paper we refer to agreements between surrogate
mothers and commissioning parents as “surrogacy
arrangements” unless the context requires otherwise. This
usage reflects the fact that it is unlikely that strict contract law
principles would apply if the agreements unravelled. Juliet
Guichon asserts that,
[t]he use of “contract” incorrectly implies that
commercial law would govern in a disputed
case, when in fact family law would apply.
19

Renvoi fait par le gouvernement du Québec en vertu de la Loi sur les
renvois à la Cour d'appel, L.R.Q. ch. R-23, relativement à la
constitutionnalité des articles 8 à 19, 40 à 53, 60, 61 et 68 de la Loi
sur la procréation assistée, L.C. 2004, ch. 2 (Dans l'affaire du), 2008
QCCA 1167, 298 D.L.R. (4th) 712. The current challenge is on
federalism grounds only. It has been argued that aspects of the AHRA
violate the Charter. See Dana Hnatiuk, “Proceeding with Insufficient
Care: A Comment on the Susceptibility of the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act to Challenge Under Section 7 of the Charter”
(2007) 65 U.T. Fac. L.R. 39.
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Moreover the word “contract” wrongly suggests
that the deal can be enforced by law, even
though no Canadian province has done so.
Contract law is an essential tool of commerce
and regards a deal as a deal. It assumes that
people are autonomous, rational, self-interested
and equal. However, family law accepts that
people are interdependent, capable of
irrationality, self-giving and vulnerable. Family
law focuses on the body, emotions, and
changing intentions; it ... places the needs of
children first – irrespective of shifting adult
intentions.20

SURROGACY LAWS IN CANADA,
THE UNITED STATES, AND BRITAIN
Canada
The federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act was passed in
2004 by the Canadian federal government after a 17 year
public debate that included the RCNRT, eight different bills,
and numerous Parliamentary and Senate hearings.21 It reflects
the advice received from the RCNRT and early feminist
thinking.
Section 6 creates various criminal offences,
including the offence of paying or offering to pay a woman to
20

Juliet Guichon, “The body, emotions and intentions: challenges of
preconception arrangements for health care providers” (2007) 176
Canadian Medical Association Journal 479; see also Robert Leckey,
“Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 Univ. of
Toronto L.J. 1.

21

See Jean Haase, “Canada: The Long Road to Regulation” in Eric
Blyth and Ruth Landau, eds., Third Party Assisted Conception Across
Cultures: Social, Legal and Ethical Perspective (United Kingdom:
Jessica Kingsley Publishers Ltd, 2004) 55.
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be a surrogate mother. Section 12 provides that surrogates and
others can be reimbursed for expenses as set out in regulations.
However, s. 12 has not yet been proclaimed in force and
therefore no regulations enabling surrogacy have been passed.22
Section 12 (but not s. 6) is under challenge before the Supreme
Court of Canada. The intent of these provisions is to prohibit
commercial, but not gratuitous, surrogacy. Anyone
participating in a commercial surrogacy arrangement risks a
22

S.C. 2004 c. 2. The provisions are as follows:
6. (1) No person shall pay consideration to a female person to be a
surrogate mother, offer to pay such consideration or advertise that it
will be paid.
(2) No person shall accept consideration for arranging for the services
of a surrogate mother, offer to make such an arrangement for
consideration or advertise the arranging of such services.
(3) No person shall pay consideration to another person to arrange for
the services of a surrogate mother, offer to pay such consideration or
advertise the payment of it.
(4) No person shall counsel or induce a female person to become a
surrogate mother, or perform any medical procedure to assist a female
person to become a surrogate mother, knowing or having reason to
believe that the female person is under 21 years of age.
(5) This section does not affect the validity under provincial law of
any agreement under which a person agrees to be a surrogate mother.
…
12. (1) No person shall, except in accordance with the regulations and
a licence,
(a) reimburse a donor for an expenditure incurred in the course of
donating sperm or an ovum;
(b) reimburse any person for an expenditure incurred in the
maintenance or transport of an in vitro embryo; or
(c) reimburse a surrogate mother for an expenditure incurred by her in
relation to her surrogacy.
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fine of up to $500,000 or 10 years imprisonment. As the
federal government’s only jurisdiction for passing an assisted
reproduction law is the criminal law power, the statute must in
its intent and effect proscribe criminal behaviour by imposing
penal sanctions (the RCNRT asserted that the “national
concern” branch of the federal “peace, order and good
government” power provided the primary jurisdictional basis
for federal regulation of new reproductive technologies, the
federal government did not try to justify the AHRA on the basis
of this doctrine before the Supreme Court of Canada23). The
federal government does not have the jurisdiction to regulate
activities which are simply undesirable. According to Angela
Cameron,
as an overall policy goal, the [AHRA] seeks to
prevent
the
commercialization
or
commodification of ‘life’. This includes buying
or selling any of the ‘raw ingredients’ for
making a baby, babies themselves through
gestational contracts. ... This goal is reflected
throughout the Act by variously prohibiting and
regulating activities such as surrogacy and the
sale of sperm and eggs.24
The AHRA defines a “surrogate mother” as a woman
who carries a fetus conceived by assisted reproduction and
23

See RCNRT supra note 6 at 19-22. The “national concern” doctrine
permits the federal government to assume jurisdiction if the subject
matter has a “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from a matter of provincial concern and a scale of
impact on provincial jurisdiction that it compatible with the
fundamental distribution of legislation power under the Constitution”:
R. v. Crown Zellerbach [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 at 432.

24

Angela Cameron, “Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted
Human Reproduction Act” (2008) 24 Can J. Fam. L. 101 at para. 11.
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derived from the genes of a donor or donors with the intention
of surrendering the child at birth to the donor or another
person. Therefore, it applies to both traditional surrogacy
(where the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother) and
gestational surrogacy (where she is not). While most surrogate
mothers until the late-1980s would have been impregnated by
assisted insemination and therefore are the genetic mothers of
the children, by 1994, about 50 percent of surrogacies involved
the implantation of an embryo created using the genetic
materials of others. This figure climbed to 95 percent by
2003.25 Obviously, gestational surrogacy can only be achieved
in a clinic setting and most Canadian clinics will require that
the parties enter into some kind of an agreement before they
will perform the procedure.
While the AHRA came into force in 2004, the regime
is, quite simply, not effective. The board charged with
preparing regulations that would give effect to most aspects of
the licensing regime has not finalized any recommendations.
Thus, regulations regarding matters such as reimbursement of
surrogacy-related expenses and operating standards for fertility
clinics (on matters such as the number of permissible IVF
implants, participant screening, records maintenance,
requirement for independent legal advice) have not been
developed. The statutorily-mandated date for a five year
review of the AHRA has come and gone without any hint of the
25

Heléna Ragoné “Of Likeness and Difference: How Race is Being
Transformed by Gestational Surrogacy” in Heléna Ragoné & France
Winddance Twine, eds., Ideologies and Technologies of Motherhood:
Race, Class, Nationalism [New York: Routledge, 2000) [Ragoné,
“Of Likeness and Difference”] and David P. Hamilton, “She’s
Having Our Baby: Surrogacy is on the Rise as In Vitro Improves”
The Wall Street Journal (4 February 2003), online: The Wall Street
Journal
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1044305510652
776 944.html?mod=googlewsj>.
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review. This inaction together with the federalism challenge
has created a situation where the law regulating reproductive
technologies is uncertain, at best.
Surrogate mothers,
commissioning parents, donors, and healthcare and other
service providers who participate in making any assisted
human reproduction arrangements are operating in the shadows
of the law especially if any money changes hands. It appears
that no surrogacy-related charges have been laid under the
AHRA. However, Toronto lawyer Sherry Levitan, who has
been working on surrogacy-related files since 1994, says that
“trying to work within the current legislation is like walking
through a fog”.26
Provinces have jurisdiction over broad areas that are
implicated by surrogacy arrangements including the regulation
of professions, licensing of businesses, regulation of contracts
and parenting issues including birth registration, adoption and
custody and access (except in a divorce situation). All
provinces and territories have laws stating that custody and
access decisions should be made using the “best interests of the
child” test and they prohibit, in effect, buying children through
adoption.27 As discussed in more detail below, only Quebec,
Nova Scotia, Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador have
statutes specifically concerning surrogacy arrangements.
Courts in Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba have
established precedents on birth registration. In 1985, the
Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that
commercial surrogacy contracts be statutorily regulated (before

26

See “Surrogacy in Canada,” online: Sherry Levitan <www.fertility
law.ca/surrogacy.shtml>.

27

See, for example, The [Manitoba] Adoption Act, C.C.S.M. c. A2, s. 3
(the best interests test) and s. 120(1) prohibiting the
commercialization of adoptions.
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the Baby M case changed the political landscape), but those
recommendations were not followed.28
Article 541 of the Quebec Civil Code (“Code”)
provides that “any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to
procreate or carry a child for another person is absolutely
void.”29 In June 2009, An Act respecting clinical and research
activities relating to assisted procreation was passed by the
Quebec National Assembly (although it is not yet in force).30
Under the new Act any assisted procreation activities, which
include both assisted inseminations and embryo implants, must
be carried out at a centre licensed under the act and in
accordance with any regulations. The Act is silent on
surrogacy. In X, sub. nom Adoption -091, a Quebec court was
asked to permit a commissioning mother to adopt a child born
in 2008 to a surrogate mother. The line on the birth registration
for the mother’s name had been left blank and the
commissioning father was named as the father. The application
was not opposed by the surrogate mother. The commissioning
parents had agreed to pay the surrogate mother $20,000 for
“inconvenience and expenses” [trans]. The court held that in
the face of the Code’s description of such agreements as
“absolutely void” [trans] the commissioning mother could not
be permitted to adopt the child. It stated that “the child does not
have the right to a maternal affiliation at any price. To give
effect to the father’s consent to the adoption of his child would
28

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial
Reproduction and Related Matters (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney
General, 1985).

29

Civil Code, 1991, c. 64, online at: <http://www2.publications
duquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C
CQ/CCQ_A.html>.

30

S.Q. 2009, C. 30, online at: http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/39
legislature1/Projets-loi/Publics/09-a026-san.htm.
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for the agency, in the circumstances, require wilful blindness
and confirm that the ends justify the means” [trans]. 31
Nova Scotia regulations provide that where a surrogacy
arrangement was made prior to conception, the surrogate
mother did not intend to parent the child and if one of the
intended parents has a genetic link to the child, the birth
registration can be amended on court order to remove the
surrogate mother from the registration and to register the
intended parents as the parents.32 The regulation does not
expressly require the surrogate mother’s post-delivery consent
to the order or even that she be given notice that an order is
being sought. Alberta legislation provides that if a child is a
product of the donor’s genetic material and the “gestational
carrier” consents, on application “the court shall make an order
declaring the genetic donor to be the sole mother of the
child”.33 The gestational carrier must, after the child’s birth,
consent to the application. Consent given prior to birth, as
formalized in a gestational carrier agreement, may not be used
as evidence of consent post-birth. Newfoundland and Labrador
surrogacy legislation34 provides that the registrar general can
register the “intended parents” of a child “born through a
surrogacy arrangement” if an adoption order or a declaratory
order regarding parentage has been made by a court. These
orders may be sought before the child is born and the consent
of the surrogate mother is not expressly required. None of the
legislative regimes in the common law provinces expressly
31

2009 QCCQ 628 para 77-78.

32

[Nova Scotia] Birth Registration Regulation N.S. Reg. 390/2007.

33

Family Law Act, S.A. 2003 c.F-4.5, s. 12.

34

Vital Statistics Act, S.N.L. 2009, c. V-6.01, s. 5 read together with the
Adoption Act, S.N.L. 1999, c.A-2.1, s. 25 and the Children’s Law Act,
R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, s. 6.
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consider what happens if the surrogate mother does not consent
to the order.
Case law in British Columbia, coupled with a policy
drafted by the Vital Statistics department, permits
commissioning parents (even where they do not have a genetic
connection to the fetus) to apply prior to birth for an order
regarding birth registration.35 The British Columbia Superior
Court held in the B.A.N case (at paragraph 15) that it “… has
the power in equity to grant the [pre-birth] declaration of
parentage sought. However, this power must be exercised in
accordance with equitable principles, judicially and only where
necessary.” Courts in Ontario developed a “roadmap” for
procedures to be used to issue post-birth orders, declaring
commissioning parents to be the parents of a child born to a
surrogate mother and for declaring that neither the surrogate
mother nor her husband are the child’s parents.36 A Manitoba
court held that it did not have the jurisdiction to order a prebirth parentage declaration in a surrogacy situation.37
There is only one reported Canadian case, H.L.W. and
T.H.W. v. J.C.T and J.T.,38 involving a custodial contest
between a surrogate mother (and her husband) and
commissioning parents. In that case, a dispute arose shortly
before birth over what expenses would be paid and, after the
child was born, another dispute arose over what kind of
35

Rypkema v. British Columbia, 2003 BCSC 1784, [2003] B.C.J. No.
2721 and B.A.N. v. J.H., 2008 BCSC 808, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 564.

36

J.R. v. L.H. [2002[ O.J. #3998 (Ont. S.C.) and M.D. v. L.L. 2008
CanLII 9374 (Ont.S.C.). The roadmap reference is in para. 29 of the
J.R. decision.

37

J.C. v. Vital Statistics, 2000 MBQB 173.

38

2005 BCSC 1679, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 680.
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relationship the surrogate mother and her family would have
with the child (note that this agreement was made before
making payments to a surrogate mother was prohibited by the
AHRA). When these disputes continued unresolved, the
surrogate mother and her husband sought custody of the child.
The court held that the commissioning parents should retain
custody pending trial and denied access to the surrogate
mother. No trial decision is reported. The other Canadian cases
which focus on surrogacy arrangements involve birth
registrations, parentage declarations, or access disputes
between commissioning parents. 39
The United States
The American federal government has not passed laws related
to the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements. Elizabeth
Scott found that in the immediate post-Baby M period, state
law makers moved to prohibit or severely restrict surrogacy
arrangements. However, since 2000, surrogacy is seen as a
service provided by surrogate mothers and regulators focus on
the pragmatic objective of reducing procedural and substantive
uncertainty about parental status. 40 She notes that this trend
39

See, for example, Rypkema and B.A.N, supra note 35; J.C. v. Vital
Statistics, supra note 37 and M.D. v. L.L. supra note 36. S.W.H. v.
D.J.R., [2009] A.B.Q.B. 438 involves an access dispute over a six
year old child who was conceived by a woman who agreed to act as a
surrogate for the male plaintiff and his male partner. The surrogate
mother remained very involved in the girl’s life and conceived
another child with the same man, whom she was raising with her
female partner. When the gay couple broke up, the genetic parents of
the girl attempted, unsuccessfully, to deny the social father access to
the girl.

40

Elizabeth Scott, “Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification”,
Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems [forthcoming]. For a
more detailed comparative analysis of American state laws, see Judith
F. Daar, Reproductive Technologies and the Law (Newark, New
Jersey: LexisNexus Matthew Bender, 2006) and Pamela Laufer-
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can be seen in statute law, bills introduced and reforms to the
uniform law prototype, all which are increasingly supporting
the enforcement of surrogacy contracts.41 For example, Florida
and Utah42 have passed laws that specifically allow for
commercial gestational surrogacy and deny any parental rights
to surrogate mothers. Arkansas law provides for an
unconditional presumption of validity of both gestational and
traditional surrogacy contracts.43
Some states, such as
Illinois,44 provide for pre-birth registration and require that
birth certificates be issued in the name of genetic parents.
Others, such as Texas and Nevada,45 will only enforce
surrogacy contracts if the commissioning parents are
heterosexual and married to each other, and therefore, restrict
participation in such arrangements by married same-sex
partners, common law partners, and single people.46 In 2009,
Georgia became the first state to pass an embryo adoption law,
albeit this act may be more about securing fetal rights as part of

Ukeles, “Gestation: Work for Hire of the Essence of Motherhood? A
Comparative Legal Analysis” (2003) 19 Duke J. Gender L. & P’y 91.
41

Scott, ibid. manuscript version at 16-17. Daar, ibid at 473-477 makes
the same observation.

42

FLA.STAT. 742.11-15; FLA.STAT. 63.212 (2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. 78-45g-801(3) (2005).

43

ARK.CODE ANN.9-10-201 (2002).

44

See Scott supra note 41, manuscript version at 18; 750
ILL.COMP.STAT. 45/6 (2002).

45

TEX.FAM.CODE 160.754; TEX FAM.CODE 160.762; NEV.
REV.STAT.ANN. 126.045 (2001).

46

See Judith Daar, “Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible
Barriers, Indelible Harms” (2008) 23 Berk. J. Gender Law & Justice
18.
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a pro-life strategy than about securing early certainty regarding
the enforcement of surrogacy arrangements.47
According to Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, a number of state
laws render surrogacy arrangements unenforceable and rely on
the “best interests” test to determine custody and access.48
However, she notes that these statutes were enacted before
gestational surrogacy was a viable alternative and it is unclear
whether the statutes apply to both traditional and gestational
surrogacies. Only a small number of jurisdictions, including
Michigan, New York, and the District of Columbia,49 continue
to prohibit surrogacy contracts using penal sanctions although,
as in Canada, there do not appear to have been any
prosecutions to date.
About 20 American states have not passed legislation
dealing with surrogacy, so judge-made law remains
determinative.50 Laufer-Ukeles provides an extensive review
of many, if not all, reported surrogacy-related decisions of
American courts. She notes that American courts have
consistently held that traditional surrogacy arrangements
(where the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother) are
either invalid and unenforceable or at least voidable and
therefore, as in the Baby M case, rely on the “best interests of
the child” test. However, relying on arguments related to intent
47

Ga. Code Ann. 19-8-40 (2009). See also David Becker, “Georgia
Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Law” The Voice (4 April
2009), online: The Voice Magazine <http://www.thevoicemagazine
.com/georgia-passes-nation's-first-embryo-adoption-law-2009040452
5.html> (accessed July 4, 2009).

48

Laufer-Ukeles supra note 40 at 103.

49

MCLS 722.851-861 (2002); NY Dom. Rel. 122 (2001); D.C. Code
16-401, 402 (2002).

50

This information is gleaned from a table provided by Daar, supra
note 47 at 465-470.

Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale

35

or genetics, they have also consistently held that gestational
surrogacy arrangements (where the surrogate mother is not the
genetic mother) are different. Laufer-Ukeles also notes that
“all U.S. courts ultimately favor the intended parents in
gestational surrogate motherhood arrangements”.51
With one exception,52 the early American cases
involving disputes between surrogate mothers and the
commissioning parents were decided in the 1980s. It appears
that the commissioning parents were awarded custody in all of
these cases, although in some cases, including Baby M, the
surrogate mother was granted access. Litigation in the last 20
years concerning surrogacy is not between surrogate mothers
and the commissioning parents; rather it arose either when the
commissioning parents experienced difficulties registering the
child as their own or where relationships fell apart and issues
arose over parentage, custody, access and support. Given
estimates that at least 1000 surrogacy arrangements are entered
into annually in the United States,53 the lack of litigation is
remarkable.

51

Ibid. note 40 at 103.

52

Anna J. v. Mark C. 286 Cal Rptr. 369 (Ct.App. 1991) aff’d sub nom.
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S.
874 (1993) decided on appeal in 1993, is the only post-1980s case.
Here, the court found in favour of a genetic mother and justified
cutting off access to the surrogate mother by finding that the
surrogacy contract (which had stated that all ties would be cut) ought
to be enforced. For an analysis of this case, see Roxanne Mykitiuk,
“Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in the
Context of Assisted Human Reproduction Technologies” (2001) 39
Osgoode Hall L.J. 771.

53

Lee, supra note 12. See also the other references in that note.
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Britain
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act (1985) together with the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act (1990) prohibit
commercial surrogacy arrangements and the use of for-profit
agents but permit reimbursement for reasonable expenses to
surrogate mothers.54 Intermediaries can be charged with
criminal offences; sanctions for surrogate mothers and
commissioning parents lie in the refusal to grant a parental
order. Most would-be surrogate mothers and commissioning
parents do not use a lawyer to draft contracts.55 There are no
media or other reports of criminal prosecutions against
agencies since these two acts were passed.
While surrogacy contracts are not binding, it appears
that there have only been a handful of cases (discussed below)
related to post-delivery custodial arrangements. Surrogate
mothers (irrespective of whether they have a genetic
connection to the child) must be named on the birth certificate.
Genetic fathers may be named on the birth certificate or they
can enter into parental responsibility agreements with the
surrogate mother upon the birth of the child. Six weeks after
the birth, married genetic commissioning parents, with the
consent of the surrogate mother, can apply for a “parental
order” which, once granted, will give them full, permanent and
exclusive parental rights.56 Single people, common law
heterosexual couples, and same sex couples who participate in
54

1985, c. 49 and 1990, c. 37. See Myriam Hunter-Henin, “Surrogacy:
Is there Room for a New Liberty Between the French Prohibitive
Position and the English Ambivalence?” (2008) II Law and Bioethics
329.

55

“Solicitors”, Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy, online:
COTS <http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/SolicitorsMap.htm>.

56

Adoption and Children’s Act (U.K.), 2002, c.38 (formerly the
Children’s Act (U.K.), 1989, c. 41).

Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale

37

surrogacy arrangements as commissioning parents must apply
for an adoption order.
Britain had one very high profile case, in 1985, where
a child welfare agency apprehended a child upon hearing that
Kim Cotton, her surrogate mother, who had been paid £6500,
was about to surrender her to the commissioning parents.
Seven days later a court held that the baby should go to the
commissioning parents. While there was no dispute between
the participants to the arrangements, the Baby Cotton case
generated significant public controversy over baby-selling and
resulted in quick passage of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act.
Cotton went on to found the largest British agency that
matched potential surrogate mothers and commissioning
parents.57
There are three reported English cases58 involving
disputes between surrogate mothers and the commissioning
parents. In the two earlier cases, custody was awarded to the
parent who had had custody of the children since birth. In one
case this was the surrogate mother and in the other it was the
commissioning parents. In the 2008 case, the surrogate mother
had twice deceived the commissioning parents, telling them
that she had miscarried when, in fact, she gave birth to the
children and was raising them together with her husband. On
an interim basis, the two children were made wards of the
court, with the six year old staying with the surrogate mother
and her husband and the 18 month old moving into the home of
the commissioning parents. No final decision has been

57

For the surrogate mother’s account, see Kim Cotton & Denise Winn,
Baby Cotton: for love and money (London: Dorling Kindersley,
1985).

58

Re: P (Minors) (Wardship:Surrogacy), [1987] 2 FLR 421; Re: MW
(Adoption:Surrogacy), [1995] 2 FLR 759; Re: P (Surrogacy:
Residence), [2008] 1 FLR 177.
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reported. All other reported decisions relating to surrogacy
addressed legal parentage or payment issues.
COMPARISON AND SUMMARY OF CANADIAN,
AMERICAN, AND BRITISH SURROGACY LAWS
Canada, many American states, and Britain take different legal
approaches to surrogacy arrangements and issues relating to
parentage. Canada prohibits any payments (including, in the
absence of regulations, even expenses) to a surrogate mother or
third parties and expensive, sometimes prolonged judicial
proceedings are required in most provinces after the birth of the
child to finalize parentage. American states have various laws,
but only a few place criminal sanctions on payments of both
expenses and fees to surrogate mothers. The trend is toward
expedited pre-birth determination of parentage by civil servants
especially for heterosexual married couples. Britain permits
payment of reasonable expenses (but not fees) to surrogate
mothers and has an expedited post-birth parentage-registration
regime for married couples that still require judicial
involvement. Unmarried people must apply for an adoption
order. What is common between the three countries is that it
appears no prosecutions for fee payments (even though such
payments are made in Canada and Britain) or exploitative
behaviour. Further, there has been almost no litigation in any
of these countries in the last two decades between surrogate
mothers and commissioning parents on any issues related to the
surrogacy arrangements, such as conduct during pregnancy or
parentage, custody, or access regarding the child after birth.
This observation could indicate relative satisfaction with the
arrangements or an inability to contest them for financial
reasons, fear of repercussions, or recognition that the
commissioning parents are likely to be the successful litigants.
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FEMINIST THEORY MEETS EMPIRICISM
Three inter-related rationales are given for prohibiting
commercial surrogacy arrangements: a surrogate mother
cannot give meaningful consent prior to delivery and therefore
the contracts could be unconscionable; the potential for
exploitation of surrogate mothers is so significant that the
contracts must be unenforceable and discouraged; and, the
payment of money for reproductive services commodifies
women and children and is, therefore, contrary to human
dignity. The RCNRT was deeply influenced by all three of
these arguments.
In this part of the paper, the factual underpinnings of
the RCNRT’s theoretical concerns will be tested against the
empirical research by academic researchers on the experiences
of surrogate mothers and other aspects of surrogate
arrangements conducted in the last two decades. Anecdotal
and popular accounts are also referenced but they are not relied
upon to support conclusions unless a more rigorous
methodology also supports the conclusion. Many of the nearly
40 empirical studies we reviewed in this paper are interviewbased qualitative studies involving surrogate mothers and,
therefore, the voices of those most directly impacted can be
heard. Other methodologies, such as standard form
psychological testing and clinical or agency file reviews, are
also used. All of the empirical studies cited in this paper are
peer-reviewed and all but one59 are published in academic
journals or by academic presses. To give some context for each
study reviewed, the date, jurisdiction, methodology, and
sample size is noted in the text of this paper. However, it is
59

The exception is Kashmeri, supra note 15 is a thesis written for a
Masters of Arts (Anthropology) and it has not (yet) been published by
an academic publisher.
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well beyond the scope of this paper to review and critique the
methodologies used in each study or to suggest research gaps.
Readers interested in that information may find Ciccarelli and
Beckman’s research useful as it provides more technical
information on 27 empirical studies published between 1983
and 2003, including a dense four page table, that sets
jurisdiction, sample size, data collection methods, variables,
and limitations.60
Most of the research considered in this paper was
conducted in the United States or Britain. Shireen Kashmeri’s
2004 ethnographic study is the only Canadian empirical study
on participants’ experiences.61 The only other Canadian
empirical studies relating to surrogacy focus on public attitudes
towards surrogacy arrangements, referred to earlier.62
Kashmeri notes that it was difficult to find Canadian surrogate
mothers who were willing to speak on the record, although she
has, with their permission, been able to carry on dialogue
within on-line communities, also known as computermediated-communication. One surrogate mother who agreed
to be interviewed in-person for Kashmeri’s study stated that
Canadian surrogates don’t want to talk because
they are being paid. If they talk, there’ll be a
record of them somewhere and they’re afraid
that it’ll get back to the couple that’s paying
them. Because they could end up in prison.
Most of them have signed a contract saying that
they won’t talk to anyone. I remember when a
couple tried to throw that into my contract and I

60

Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 17 at 25-28.

61

Kashmeri, supra note 15.

62

Krishnan, supra note 11 and Genuis, supra note 11.
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was pretty quick with that – you ain’t going to
gag me.63
However, as American and British legal regimes and the social
and economic status of women in these two countries are
comparable to legal regimes and the status of women in
Canada, it is probably safe to extrapolate these results to
Canada.
Social, Racial, and Psychological Characteristics of
Surrogate Mothers
Rakhi Ruparelia argued “the existence of power hierarchies,
even subtle ones, and the obligations that arise from close-knit
family structures, make it difficult for women to refuse a
request to be a gift surrogate”.64 Many feminists, including
Overall, Diana Majury, and Mary Lyndon Shanley, have
suggested that payment for commercial surrogacy will take
advantage of economic, physical, and emotional vulnerabilities
of women and they note the potential for exploitation of poor,
young, single, ethnic minority women. 65 Anita Allen asserted
that “minority women increasingly will be sought to serve as
“mother machines” for embryos of middle and upper-class
clients. It’s a new, virulent, form of racial and class
discrimination. Within a decade, thousands of poor and
minority women will likely be used as a “breeder class”.66
Gena Corea described the arrangements as creating a “female

63

Kashmeri, supra note 15 at 18.

64

Rakhi Ruparelia, “Giving Away the ‘Gift of Life”: Surrogacy and the
Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2007) 23 Can. J. Fam.
L. 11 at para. 43.

65

Overall, “Human Reproduction;” Overall, “A Feminist Analysis;”
Majury and Shanley, supra note 6.

66

Allen, supra note 6 (at page 7 of the on-line version).
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breeding caste”67 and Barbara Katz Rothman predicted that
gestational surrogacy would lead to a situation in which
[p]oor, uneducated third world women and
women of color from the United States and
elsewhere, with fewer economic alternatives,
can be hired more cheaply. They can also be
controlled more tightly. With a legally supported
surrogate motherhood contract and with the new
[IVF] technology the marketing possibilities are
endless–and terrifying. Just as Perdue and Holly
Farms advertise their chickens based on superior
breeding and feeding, the baby brokers could
begin to advertise their babies: brand-name,
state-of-the art babies produced from the
“finest” of genetic materials and an all-natural,
vitamin-enriched diet.68
However, studies on surrogate mothers consistently show that
most women who agree to become either gratuitous or
commercial surrogates are Caucasian, Christian, and in their
late 20-early 30s.69 Surrogate mothers have varying degrees of
67

Gena Corea, “Testimony before the California Judiciary Committee,”
April 5, 1988, cited in Larry Gostin, ed., Surrogate Motherhood:
Politics and Privacy (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988)
325.

68

Supra note 6 at 237.

69

See, for example, Janice C. Ciccarelli, The surrogate mother: A postbirth follow-up (Ph.D. Dissertation, California School of Professional
Psychology 1997 [The Surrogate Mother]; Hazel Basilington, “The
Social Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the
Role of Payment in the Psychological Detachment Process” (2002) 7
Journal of Health Psychology 57; I. Schmulker & Betsy Aigen, “The
terror of surrogate motherhood: Fantasies, realities and viable
legislation” in J. Offerman-Zuckerberg, ed., Gender in Transition: A
New Frontier (New York; Plenum, 1989) 235; Jadva et al. supra note
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education. For example, 11of 17 American surrogate mothers
in Melinda Hohman and Christine Hagan’s 2001 study had
some college education. Of the 50 American surrogate
mothers in Joan Einwohner’s 1989 study, most had completed
high school, many had gone on to college, a few had graduate
degrees and one had three masters degrees. Eric Blyth’s 1993
study of British surrogate mothers shows lower education rates
for these women than the American studies: 14 out of the 19
women interviewed had left school before the age of 17.
Beckman and Ciccarelli conclude from their review of
American empirical studies that “surrogate mothers’ family
incomes are most often modest (as opposed to low) and they
are from working class backgrounds”.70 Based on a subjective
assessment of the material standards within their homes, Blyth
determined that three of the 19 British surrogate mothers
interviewed for his study lived in “financially straitened
circumstances”.71 One woman in his study said that most

19: Joan Einwohner, “Who becomes a surrogate: Personality
Characteristics” in J. Offerman-Zuckerberg, supra this note, 123);
Christine Kleinpeter & Melinda Hohman, “Surrogate motherhood:
personality traits and satisfaction with service providers” (2000) 87
Psychological Reports 135; Melinda Hohman & Christine Hagan,
“Satisfaction with Surrogate Mothering: A Relational Model” (2001)
4 Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 61; Heléna
Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception at the Heart (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1994) [Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood]; Olga
van den Akker, “A longitudinal pre-pregnancy to post-delivery
comparison of genetic and gestational surrogate and intended
mothers: Confidence and genealogy” (2005) 26 Journal of
Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynecology 277 [van den Akker,
“Longitudinal comparison”].
70

Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 17 at 31 come to this conclusion
based on a review of the empirical studies.

71

Eric Blyth, “I wanted to be interesting. I wanted to be able to say
‘I’ve done something interesting with my life:’” Interviews with
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surrogate mothers she knew were in receipt of income support.
However, as Blyth interviewed 50 percent of the known
surrogate mothers in Britain at that time (1993) and none were
in receipt of assistance, this report seems unlikely. No other
study has reported that women in receipt of income assistance
had become surrogate mothers and many agencies connecting
would-be surrogate mothers with commissioning parents will
not take women on assistance. Importantly, no empirical study
reviewed for this paper indicates that any surrogate mothers
became involved with surrogacy because they were
experiencing financial distress.
Almost all commissioning parents were married;
surrogate mothers, however, were less likely to be married or
partnered. Timothy Appleton reports, for example, that only 68
percent of the 140 surrogate mothers in his study were married
or partnered.72 Not surprisingly, given the high costs of
surrogacy and the fact that they do not usually have children
yet, the commissioning parents were older, more educated and
had higher incomes than the surrogate mothers and their
partners.73 Olga van den Akker states that “no negative effects
of this socioeconomic inequity have been reported”.74
surrogate mothers in Britain” (1994) 12 Journal of Reproductive and
Infant Psychology 189 [Blyth, “Interesting”].
72

Timothy Appleton, “Emotional Aspects of Surrogacy: A Case for
Effective Counselling and Support” in Rachel Cook, Shelley Day
Sclater, & Felicity Kaganas, eds., Surrogate Motherhood:
International Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 199
[Appleton, “Emotional Aspects].

73

See, for example, Jadva et al., supra note 18 (note that the
commissioning parents paired with the surrogate women who were
interviewed for this study were themselves interviewed in Fiona
MacCallum, Emma Lycett, Clare Murray, Vasanti Jadva, Susan
Golombok, “Surrogacy: The experiences of commissioning couples”
(2003) 18 Human Reproduction 1334); van den Akker,
“Psychological trait and state characteristics, social support and
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Janice Ciccarelli and Linda Beckman, after surveying
the empirical literature, conclude that “women of color are
greatly under-represented as surrogate mothers”.75 With one
exception, all surrogate mothers in the reported cases are white
and in the one case where a self-described, half-Black woman
was the surrogate mother, the commissioning mother was
described as “Philippina”.76 The only exception is Heléna
Ragoné. She notes that all participants in her 1994 study were
Euro-American, but that this figure changed for her 2000 study
on gestational surrogacy. Thirty percent of the surrogate
mothers and commissioning parents in the later study were not
from the same racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds.77
However, she suggests that it is just as likely for a EuroAmerican woman to carry a child for a non-Euro-American
couple as for the reverse to occur. She heard that some
participants prefer not to be matched with someone who shares
attitudes to the surrogate pregnancy and baby” (2007) 22 Human
Reproduction 2287 [van den Akker, “Psychological trait”]; van den
Akker, “Longitudinal comparison,” supra note 70; Basilington,
supra note 70; Timothy Appleton, “Emotional Aspects” ibid.; Eric
Blyth, “‘Not a primrose path’: Commissioning parents’ experiences
of surrogacy arrangements in Britain” (1995) 13 Journal of
Reproductive and Infant Psychology 185 [Blyth, “Primrose”] and
Christine Kleinpeter, Tamara Lee Boyer & Mary Ellen Kinney,
“Parents’ Evaluation of a California-Based Surrogacy Program”
(2006) 13 J.of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 1.
74
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their race or ethnicity because they believe that it would be less
likely that the surrogate mother will feel a strong connection to
a child who is different from her. As one surrogate mother
said, “I haven’t [thought of the child as mine], because she is
not mine, she never has been. For one thing, she is totally
Japanese. It was a little hard for me. In a way she will always
be my Japanese girl, but she is theirs”.78
Some
researchers
have
used
standardized
psychological tests to assess surrogate mothers. They have
concluded that surrogate mothers are within normal ranges on
these tests.79 Surrogate mothers are more likely than the
general population to be self-sufficient, independent thinkers,
and nonconformists and, therefore, they are less affected by
social proscriptions and sanctions than other women. 80
Christine Kleinpeter and Melissa Hohman found that the 17
American surrogate mothers in their study scored much higher
on the extroversion factor than other women.81 This factor
indicates a person who is sociable, assertive, active, energetic,
and optimistic. On the basis of these psychological tests,
Einwohner concludes that surrogate mothers are intelligent,
78
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See Einwohner, supra note 69; Andrea Mechanick Braverman &
Stephen Corson, “Characteristics of participants in a gestational
carrier program” (1992) 9 Journal of Assisted Reproduction and
Genetics 353; Darrell Franks, “Psychiatric Evaluation of women in a
surrogate mother program” (1981) 138 American Journal of
Psychiatry 1378; van den Akker, “Genetic and gestational surrogate
mothers' experience of surrogacy” (2003) 21:2 Journal of
Reproductive and Infant Psychology 145 [van den Akker,
“Experience of surrogacy”]; Jadva et al., supra note 18; Kleinpeter &
Hohman, supra note 69; and Hohman & Hagan, supra note 69. For a
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self-aware, stable adults who are down to earth, practical, and
decent people who are optimistic and not worriers.82
Ragoné notes that screening and selection procedures
in the United States are stringent because surrogacy is
commercial and subject to more professional regulation.83
However, a 1999 British study on organizational selection and
assessment of the psychological health of potential surrogate
mothers found that “psychosocial assessment was minimally
addressed by all organizations and no fixed procedures for
assessment and selection were employed”.84 Since that report,
others British studies have recommended screening protocols
for both surrogate mothers and commissioning parents.85
Many theorists have stated that a potential surrogate
cannot make a rational choice when she signs the contract,
because the emotional volatility of pregnancy and the
instability of woman’s embodiment may cause her to change
her mind during pregnancy.86 The RCNRT concluded that the
82
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physical and hormonal changes of pregnancy may “affect her
thoughts and feelings about what she is doing and the foetus
she is carrying, [and] these effects cannot be predicted
precisely before pregnancy begins”.87 Almost all surrogate
mothers in every study reviewed had already had children and
had completed their families.88 Clinics and agencies report that
they will only agree to work with women who have given birth
because this status increases the chances of a successful
pregnancy and delivery and means that the women have a more
realistic perception of what it would mean for them to
surrender a child.89
A study by Judith Parkinson et al. of 98 British
surrogate mothers involved a review of their medical files and
interviews with them, commissioning parents, and doctors after
the child’s birth. All surrogate mothers had already given birth
to two or three children before entering surrogacy
arrangements. This study concluded that the surrogate mothers
had “a confident psychological framework regarding
pregnancy and birth”.90 In one of the few longitudinal studies
on surrogacy arrangements, van den Akker interviewed 22
British surrogate mothers before conception and then again six
months post-delivery. She concluded that
[s]urrogate mothers were highly confident from
the start about the surrogacy process and about
87
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the health and well-being of the surrogate baby
... many knew that they could do this
emotionally, and were convinced that they
would succeed, demonstrating self-efficacy at
the start (when one would have expected them to
have some doubts), and six months post
relinquishment.91
As will be discussed, most surrogate mothers reported
good relationships with commissioning parents and that they
had few difficulties, if any, with relinquishing the child. Most
women interviewed by researchers had been a surrogate mother
only once, although many said that they would do it again.92
For example, of the 19 women interviewed for Blyth’s study
only five women said that they would not do it again. Of these
five, age was a factor for one; two had already done it twice
(and that was enough) and two reported that they regretted the
decision to become involved in surrogacy and would not do it
again. In most studies only a small number of women had been
a surrogate twice and no one had entered more than two such
arrangements. The number of women who had been surrogate
mothers more than once was somewhat higher in the Blyth
study and in Hazel Basilington’s study of British surrogate
mothers, where six of 19 and three of the 14 women,
respectively, were pregnant as a surrogate mother for a second
time. One woman in each study was expecting her third child
conceived in this way.
One consistent finding in the empirical research is that
the idea of becoming a surrogate mother started with the
91
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women themselves;93 there was no evidence in any study
indicating that women were being pressured or coerced into
becoming surrogate mothers. After one literature review,
Christine Kerian concluded that “women’s motivations for
becoming surrogates are legitimate and thoroughly thought
out”.94 An interview-based study of 17 American women
concluded that “far from being ‘used’ or exploited as has been
suggested, the participants in this study appeared to be very
clear that this is what they wanted to do, often despite negative
responses from those around them”.95
None of the American studies and only a few of the
British studies comment on the relationship between the
surrogate mothers and the commissioning parents prior to their
discussions concerning surrogacy. Where this factor is noted,
one study found that all or almost all parties were strangers to
each other, but others have noted that between 20 percent and
50 percent of the surrogate mothers were friends or family
members of the commissioning parents.96 None of these
studies give support to the theory that women are being
coerced by family members to participate in either gratuitous or
commercial surrogacy arrangements.
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Rakhi Ruparelia97 argues that some women living in
western countries who are members of some sub-cultures (such
as those with South Asian roots) may not have a real choice but
to agree to be a surrogate for a family member. This concern is
heightened where women are financially dependent on their
families, live with cultural norms that demand passivity and
self-sacrifice, and are subject to powerful patriarchal norms.
Ruparelia’s analysis relies on anecdotes and most of the stories
concern participants living in India. However, the empirical
research on surrogate mothers in Britain and the United States
(which, like Canada, have significant newcomer populations
and established South Asian sub-cultures) indicates that few
racial minority women are involved in surrogacy in the two
countries and, in studies were ethnicity is identified, none of
the surrogate mothers are identified as South Asian. No
empirical study has suggested that any women in these two
countries are being coerced by others into becoming surrogates,
or even doing it at the suggestion of others. Rather, the
research shows that the impetus to become a surrogate most
frequently comes from the woman herself. We must
acknowledge, however, that we are not aware of any empirical
study that focuses specifically on the experiences of surrogate
mothers who are also members of particular ethnic or racial
sub-cultures within western countries. Further, as will be
discussed, anecdotal research is emerging which shows that
women in some countries, particularly in India, are being
exploited by surrogacy contracts.
The profile of surrogate mothers emerging from the
empirical research in the United States and Britain does not
support the stereotype of poor, single, young, ethnic minority
women whose family, financial difficulties, or other
circumstances pressure her into a surrogacy arrangement. Nor
97
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does it support the view that surrogate mothers are naively
taking on a task unaware of the emotional and physical risks it
might entail. Rather, the empirical research establishes that
surrogate mothers are mature, experienced, stable, self-aware,
and extroverted non-conformists who make the initial decision
that surrogacy is something that they want to do.
Financial Motivation to be Surrogate Mothers
Many express concern that women with few other choices will
become surrogates out of economic need. Janice Raymond
describes surrogacy as a form of violence against women and
states that a surrogate mother might “consent” to the
arrangement, but “she has little self-determination if she cannot
find sustaining and dignified work and resorts to surrogacy as a
final economic resort”.98 As noted earlier, Overall described
surrogacy as “reproductive prostitution” and Martha Field
feared that a “breeder class” would emerge, and Lyndon
Shanley called it “consensual slavery”. Allen asserted that
[t]olerating practices that convert women’s
wombs and children into valuable market
commodities threatens to deny them respect as
equals.
Commercial surrogacy encourages
society to think of economically and socially
vulnerable women as at its disposal for a price.
Segments of the public will draw the obvious
parallels to slavery and prostitution99
For others, as evidenced by the massive public outcry in Britain
against the surrogate mother’s acceptance of money in the
98
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Baby Cotton case, the fear is the surrogate mother’s greed. The
Waller Committee in Australia stated that “whatever terms are
employed ... [surrogacy] is the buying and selling of a baby ...
The buying and selling of children has been condemned and
proscribed for generations”.100 Rothman stated that “the baby
has become a commodity, something a woman can produce
and sell”101 and she fears that “if we allowed babies to be sold,
some people would be under great pressure to sell their
babies”.102
Elly Teman notes in her research survey that “nearly
every study of surrogates’ motivations attempts to determine
sufficient financial distress in the surrogate’s life that might
provide a reason for her need to turn to this desperate
measure.”103 She goes on to observe that almost every study
ends up concluding that money was rarely the sole and
infrequently even the primary reason for entering the
arrangement. Ciccarelli reports that “contrary to popular
beliefs about money as the prime motive, surrogate mothers
overwhelmingly report that they choose to bear children for
others primarily out of altruistic concerns. Although financial
reasons may be present, only a handful of women mentioned
money as their main motivator”.104 As already noted, none of
the studies reveal any women agreeing to become surrogate
mothers because they were experiencing financial distress.
100
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Many studies reveal that those women who indicated
that money was one motivating factor also said that “it was a
reasonably convenient way of combining the responsibility of
looking after young children with the wish or need to earn
money”.105 Blyth notes that there was,
... virtually unanimity [among the 19 participants
of his study] that it was unrealistic to expect
surrogate mothers to carry a pregnancy and hand
over a baby (or babies) to the commissioning
parents without reimbursement of expenses at
least, in recognition of their time (e.g. loss of
earnings), inconvenience, discomfort and the
risks to which they were exposed, and the
additional costs incurred.106
Financial motivations were more strongly expressed in
two early studies than in later studies. The 1989 Einwohner
study of 50 American surrogate mothers found that 40 percent
of them said that money was the main (but not sole)
motivator.107 Basilington’s research was based on in-depth
interviews conducted in 1992-93 with 19 British women who
were members of a surrogate mothers’ self-help group.
Members encouraged each other to view the surrogacy
arrangement as a job incorporating payment. As one woman
said in answer to the question “what do you think about the
association of surrogacy with money”?
If you’re being paid for your time, it’s like a
contract and it severs it completely at the end
because it is a job done and you’re paid for it
105
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and that’s the end of it. And so if you think like
that, I think it’s, it balances everything up and
it’s like a goal to go towards if you see it.108
In light of this group encouragement, it is not surprising that 11
of the 19 women in this study said that money was a motivator
and that for four women, payment was the sole reason.109
However, several women also reported that they were surprised
to find, after joining the group, that they might be reimbursed,
as they had not originally had any expectation of payment.
There is no empirical research supporting the assertion
that women are becoming surrogate mothers because they are
facing financial distress. Most women report that money is
rarely the sole or even the prime motive for participating. It is
hardly surprising that many women who are surrogates believe
that they should be reimbursed for their expertise, time,
inconvenience, and discomfort. Surrogates like other service
providers, such as health care workers, firefighters, and foster
parents, are engaged in pursuits that involve physical risk and
discomfort, significant emotional involvement and continued
engagement (such as being “on call”). They often have
altruistic motives for doing what they do and yet they still
expect to be paid even if every hour is not accounted for.
Non-pecuniary Motivations for Surrogacy
The desire to help a childless couple was the prime motive
given for agreeing to be a surrogate mother. For example,
Jadva et al. report that 91 percent of the women in their study
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reported this as their prime motivation.110
mother in Kashmeri’s study stated that

One surrogate

DH [dear husband] and I have completed our
family but I was disappointed at never having
the opportunity to be pregnant again. At the
same time, I was becoming increasingly
disillusioned with, what I feel are, the social
injustices of gay rights. Yes, gay celebrities are
able to adopt but for the average joe/josephine,
most states have slammed the door on gay
parental rights. With surrogacy, I can help create
a family for a person who otherwise would have
no way of fulfilling their dream or parenthood,
AND experience pregnancy again for myself ...
well, I only needed to know where to sign up!111
Some researchers noted that several donors saw their
donative acts not so much as altruistic gifts but as projects of
the self. Rhonda Shaw, who interviewed 14 New Zealander
women, observed that,
[t]he reasons donors give for donating gametes
or reproductive services are pro-social in
orientation. Although gift language was not
always foregrounded in the narratives of the
women I interviewed, many of my interviewees
saw their donations as symbolizing acts of
human connection and solidarity in accordance
110
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with approaches to ethics that stress women’s
capacity for relatedness. The range of reasons
my interviewees offered included empathy for
other women who want to have children, being
generous and wanting to help someone else, and
familial love, obligation or responsibility.112
Others noted that the ability to be a surrogate gave them a
sense of uniqueness and accomplishment, enhanced their selfesteem or allowed them to take special action. Ragoné’s
interviewees often described it as a “vocation or calling”.113
Andrea Mechanick Braverman and Stephen Corson found
(based on pre-conception psychological testing and interviews
and follow-up after conception and delivery) that potential
surrogate mothers have a strong need to be important and
believe that by participating in surrogacy, they could make a
unique and singular contribution.
As they had found
pregnancy to be pleasurable, they felt they had skills to
contribute to this arrangement.114 Kashmeri observes that
“some accounts of surrogates keenly show that they live with
these arrangements on their own terms and with a certain sense
of empowerment”.115 One of Blyth respondent’s stated, “I’m
not a mathematician or anything like that, I’m not a world class
model, I’m just normal. And I didn’t want to be normal. I
112
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wanted to be interesting, I wanted to be able to say “I’ve done
something interesting with my life”.116
Many surrogate mothers (including nine of 19 in one
study) reported that they enjoyed being pregnant and wanted to
experience pregnancy again, but they did not want to raise
more children.117 One woman said,
[i]t’s given me the chance to experience a
pregnancy and a birth when I’m in control, not
the doctors. ...I know what I’m doing this time
and I’m not going to allow things to be done to
me that were done to me in my previous
pregnancy ... One of the things that attracted me
to surrogacy [was] the opportunity to have a
pregnancy and birth without the responsibility of
having a child to bring up after it.118
A few women in some studies were motivated by what
could be called “reparative concerns”. Hohman and Hagan
interviewed one woman who said that she had a child who had
received an organ from an organ transplant. One way of giving
thanks for the donation, she reasoned, was to be a surrogate
mother. Some of the surrogate mothers in Philip Parker’s and
in Linda Kanefield’s research related their motives to having
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had an abortion, to having given up of a child for adoption, and
to the untimely loss of a family member.119
Women engaged as surrogate mothers do not see
themselves as passive participants in degrading, exploitative
work or as selfless, childbearing vessels. On the contrary,
many surrogates become involved because they want to help
someone else to experience the joy of raising children, they
truly enjoy being pregnant and want to experience pregnancy
again without the obligation to raise the child, and they want to
do something special, unique or unusual.
The Relationship Between Surrogate Mothers and the
Commissioning Parents
Some have argued that surrogacy contracts heavily regulate the
surrogate mother’s body and her conduct, including mobility,
medication, diet and the ability to decide whether to terminate
the pregnancy. This process threatens to take control away
from her and place it in the hands of the commissioning parents
or agencies. Gena Corea testified before the California
Assembly Judiciary Committee in 1988 that one man in “... the
surrogacy business ... intends to keep the inseminated women
under constant surveillance by his private detectives throughout
the nine months of their pregnancies. [The man said] that: ‘If
we’re going to do the job 100 percent, we’re going to have to
keep tabs on the women’”.120 All of the rationales given for
prohibiting commercial surrogacy are engaged by these
possibilities: such contracts are antithetical to personal
autonomy and therefore are unconscionable; they are ripe with
the potential for exploitation; and they seem to commodify
119
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women as reproductive vessels.
Corea predicted that
legitimating surrogacy would lead to “breeding brothels”.121
The empirical research repeatedly shows that the
quality of the surrogate mother’s relationship with the
commissioning parent(s) during the pregnancy and after the
birth largely determines the surrogate mother’s satisfaction
with her experience.122 For example, Ragoné123 interviewed
women who had been involved in surrogacy arrangements that
had been facilitated by one of six agencies in the United States.
Five agencies encouraged open relationships between surrogate
mothers and commissioning parents, and one agency did not.
Some surrogate mothers in the closed program experienced a
great sense of loss after relinquishing the baby. However, none
of the surrogate mothers who were encouraged by the other
five agencies to have a relationship with the commissioning
parents expressed sadness or grief about parting with the baby.
Five of the 17 surrogate mothers interviewed by Hohman and
Hagan were in an arrangement with commissioning parents
who lived in another country. Surrogate mothers expressed
satisfaction when personal relationships developed in these
situations, even though they were limited to a few visits or
some telephone contact. However, there were difficulties when
the commissioning parents did little to acknowledge the
surrogate mother or where the participants had different
cultural expectations, especially around birth practices.
121
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Jadva et al. reported that of 34 British surrogate
mothers interviewed for their study, 97 percent had harmonious
relationships with the commissioning parents at the beginning
and end of the pregnancy.124 The one woman who had a
difficult time with the commissioning parents at the beginning
of the relationship reported that the issues were resolved before
birth and that (at the time of the interview, which was at least
one year later) they still had a good relationship. No surrogate
mother reported that her relationship was characterized by
major conflict or hostility. This degree of harmoniousness is
somewhat surprising given that they also reported that the
commissioning mothers were “very involved” in the pregnancy
in 83 percent of the cases and “moderately involved” in the rest
(These results are surprising given, for example, van den
Akker’s finding in a 2007 study of twenty commissioning
mothers in Britain that commissioning mothers’ “psychological
responses during pregnancy were vigilant and slightly more
anxious toward the end when the fetus was visible, viable and
nearly born and relinquished to them”125). The commissioning
parents for 19 of 34 surrogate mothers interviewed for the
Jadva et al. study were the interviewees for the Fiona
MacCallum et al. research.126 They found a high degree of
correlation between the commissioning parents and the
surrogate mothers’ responses, notably on issues such as
expectations during the pregnancy and the quality of the
relationship that developed as the pregnancy progressed, which
were generally highly positive.
Remarkably, the findings in the Jadva et al. study are
consistent with the findings in most other research.127
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Basilington’s found that for four of 14 surrogate mothers the
relationship with the couple was difficult (a figure that is
higher than most) could have been prompted by the question,
which was “what was the most difficult part of the process for
you”? The difficulty for one woman in Basilington’s study
arose when the commissioning mother was diagnosed with a
fatal disease and the commissioning father expressed doubts
about being able to care for a dying wife and a newborn. This
situation induced severe anxiety in the surrogate mother, as she
did not want to raise another child. When the commissioning
mother’s diagnosis was changed and she was quickly treated,
the surrogate mother’s anxiety ended and the baby was happily
relinquished. A 1998 study on women who had been surrogate
mothers ten years earlier reported that half of the surrogates
reported a negative relationship with the commissioning
parents and a feeling that they were not appreciated.128
Hohman and Hagan note that all of the 17 American
surrogate mothers they interviewed “indicated that being
treated with respect, honor and care [by the commissioning
parents] were of utmost importance to them. All felt that they
were doing something unique, and wanted the immensity of
this to be appreciated”.129 They found that problems arise
when the motives and expectations of surrogate mothers and
the commissioning parents do not match. For example, some
surrogate mothers felt used when they expected to have
ongoing social contact after the birth with the commissioning
parents but this did not happen.
Surrogate mothers are more likely to be happy with the
arrangement if they can exercise control before conception and
128
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if all parties have a shared understanding of how the process
will unfold. The research demonstrated that many surrogate
mothers are active agents in their choice of commissioning
parents.130 van den Akker131 interviewed 29 women who were
seeking surrogates. Eight of the potential commissioning
mothers had been interviewed by two potential surrogate
mothers; three by three; and one by four.
Most parties
interviewed by McCallum et al. met through an agency that
had already pre-screened both the surrogate mothers and the
commissioning parents. On average, the parties (although
usually the commissioning father was not there) met six times
before the first attempt to conceive and 17 weeks passed
between the first meeting and the first attempt.132 One
surrogate mother interviewed by Hohman and Hagan said that
she was not happy with her relationship with the
commissioning parents during her first surrogacy pregnancy.
In spite of this, she still entered into another surrogacy
arrangement, but the second time around she carefully
interviewed the couples to ensure that they had similar ideas
about the relationship.
Kashmeri interviewed three Canadian lawyers involved
in discussions between the parties to surrogacy arrangements.
These discussions dealt with parties’ expectations regarding
medical issues (including abortion and multi-fetal reduction),
sharing information during the pregnancy, conduct and diet
during pregnancy, disability and life insurance (in the event
that something happened to the surrogate mother during the
130
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pregnancy), the payment of expenses (including childcare),
income replacement, details on turning over the child after
birth, parentage and post-birth contact. However, Canadian
law is clear that the pregnant woman alone is responsible for
making health care decisions during a pregnancy. The
common law views the fetus as part of the woman’s body.
Attempts by fathers or the state to interfere with a woman’s
autonomy on the ground that others have an interest in her
pregnancy have been rebuffed by courts in the last two
decades. Therefore, it is unlikely that Canadian courts would
enforce surrogacy arrangements concerning pre-natal conduct
either.133 Under Canadian law, a surrogate mother could not
voluntarily surrender her autonomy to make medical decisions
and the commissioning parent(s) cannot exercise any real
power to control her conduct during the pregnancy. Like any
competent adult, a surrogate mother also retains the right to
confidentiality, including the ability to revoke her consent to
third party information disclosure. Good practice requires that
health care providers should not care for both a surrogate
mother and a commissioning mother where in vitro fertilization
is being used.134
Kashmeri observed from her interactions with
surrogate mothers, commissioning parents and lawyers that
they knew and understood that most elements of their
relationship were not amenable to contractual regulation, such
as conduct during the pregnancy and contact after delivery.135
Therefore, the extra-legal aspects of the relationship were
133
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extremely important. Her research notes that good
communication, strong ties, and a high level of trust between
surrogate mothers and commissioning parents are necessary for
the relationship to work.136
Kashmeri’s research, which included active
participation in on-line support groups for surrogate mothers,
found that many surrogacy negotiations in Canada are
conducted without the benefit of legal or other professional
advice. As a result, the parties may fail to discuss important
issues. Some potential surrogate mothers attempted to gather
advice on negotiation and other topics from on-line discussion
groups. Blyth found that solicitors were the professional group
most likely to receive criticism from participants because of
their lack of knowledge of and experience with surrogacy
arrangements.
The immediate consequences of the failure or inability
to get sound advice can be quite detrimental to the surrogate
mother. While writing this piece in mid-2009, we heard of a
Canadian woman who was about to deliver twins for a couple
from a European country.137 An agency in X province
connected them, but the surrogate mother who lived in Y
province never actually met with anyone from the agency or
with the commissioning parents, although it was planned that
she would meet them just prior to the delivery. She was to be
paid $15,000 plus expenses and seemed unaware that such an
agreement was illegal in Canada. The commissioning parents
may have sought a Canadian surrogate mother because the
costs are about one-half of what they would be in the United
136
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States (where a surrogate is usually paid $20,000-30,000 (plus
expenses)) and British law would not permit the
commissioning mother’s name to be on the birth certificate
immediately after the birth. As well, the medical expenses
related to the pregnancy and the delivery would be picked up
by the Canadian state rather than the couple (Most private
health care plans in the United States require separate coverage
for surrogate pregnancies). Surprisingly, a fertility clinic in her
home city, successfully implanted three embryos in her and
when all three successfully implanted, she was told (it is not
clear by whom) that selective reduction to twins was
“necessary”.
The surrogate mother was told at the last minute that
the delivery “must” take place in Z province, because the
commissioning parents had learned that this jurisdiction would
issue the original birth registration in the commissioning
parent’s names rather than in her name. She then became
afraid that the medical bills related to her delivery might be
billed to her directly when she returned to her home province.
Those bills would far exceed what she was getting paid to be a
surrogate and, of course, they would only come in after the
commissioning couple and the twins had left the country. Only
then, now holed up and alone with her children in an hotel in a
strange city and about to deliver, did she finally try to get some
advice on what her liability for the medical expenses would be.
If she had been able to get proper advice before conception,
issues like the number of implants, selective reduction, place of
birth and payment of expenses (including use of a trust
account) could have been properly dealt with. In the fog of
surrogacy law in Canada, such scenarios are likely to continue,
making women like her ripe for exploitation.
The empirical research shows that surrogate mothers
can be active agents in determining whether they will work
with a commissioning couple. Often they want and expect
commissioning parents (especially the commissioning mother)
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to be involved during the pregnancy. None of the studies
support the conclusion that surrogate mothers lose their
personal autonomy during the pregnancy; rather, they report
harmonious relationships with commissioning parents.
Provided that they have access to appropriate support and
advice, there is little evidence to suggest that surrogate mothers
lack the ability to negotiate expectations and maintain
appropriate boundaries with commissioning parents, thereby
avoiding exploitation and commodification of themselves and
the child during the pregnancy. However, if they cannot, or are
hesitant to, get this information-and their ability to do so is
exacerbated by the state of Canadian law rather than facilitated
by it-anecdotal evidence demonstrates that how surrogate
mothers can be exploited.
The Emotions of the Surrogate Mother During and After
Pregnancy
Phyllis Chesler asserted that separating women from their
biological infants would cause trauma and injury to both the
mother and the child.138 Allen believed that “there are risks
inherent in surrogacy arrangements. These risks centrally
include the emotional devastation experienced by surrogates
who are compelled to give up the children that they have
agreed to bear for others”.139 The British Medical Association
and others feared that because a surrogate mother cannot
predict the full extent of the maternal bond, she may face
unanticipated emotional risks when faced with the decision to
give up a child.140 The Baby M decision voided the contract
138
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between the surrogate mother and the commissioning father on
the ground that no woman could consent to relinquishment
prior to the birth of a child.141 Others were concerned that the
physical and hormonal changes and emotional volatility of
pregnancy might impact a surrogate mother’s feelings towards
the pregnancy.142 The RCNRT stated that if the surrogate
mother “succeeds in denying her emotional responses during
this profound experience, she is dehumanized in the
process”.143
Therefore, at best, women should not be
encouraged to relinquish children and, at the very least,
voluntary informed consent is simply not possible until
sometime after the birth of a child.144
The empirical research, however, does not support the
concerns about pre-natal maternal bonding or emotional
instability during pregnancy. van den Akker’s 2007 study of
61 British surrogate mothers reported that anxiety was not high
during the pregnancy among surrogate mothers and
“detachment is reported early and maintained throughout the
pregnancy, with little post-variation post-delivery”.145 She also
found that surrogate mothers had “consistent mid range scores
on attitudes towards the pregnancy” which is “likely to reflect
141
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their continued attempts to dissociate meaning to the pregnancy
in an attempt to remain detached from it”.146 In contrast, she
found that the commissioning mothers “appear to be healthy,
inquisitive and to show concerns coupled with positive feelings
toward the fetus which are likely to reflect an attempt to form a
bond or attachment to the fetus.”147 Other studies show that
most surrogate mothers did not think of the fetus as theirs; they
considered it to be for the commissioning parents from the
beginning of the process and demonstrated lower attachment
during pregnancy than other pregnant women.148 One out of 14
American women in Ciccarelli’s 1997 study felt that she had
bonded with the child and two others identified strong
mothering instincts, but 11 of 14 stated that they did not feel
any attachment. One woman stated that “I almost felt guilty
for not feeling bad about giving up the baby”149 and even the
three women who felt attached to the baby were not reluctant to
relinquish the child.
Basilington found that “a strong
psychological component was evident in the conscious effort
by surrogate mothers to think of the surrogacy arrangement as
being a job with payment and not to think of the baby was
theirs”.150
Ragoné concluded from her interviews with
surrogate mothers that “it is the ability or strength to be able to
separate oneself from the pregnancy/child that surrogates
consider a prerequisite of surrogate motherhood”.151
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Hohman and Hagan found that how the actual delivery
and transition was handled by the commissioning parents was
an important determinant of satisfaction with the process.152
The research reports that for almost all surrogate mothers,
relinquishment was a happy event that contributed to an
increased sense of self-worth and self-confidence.153 Speaking
about their feelings after the birth, many surrogate mothers
commented on the joy of the moment when the child was
handed to the commissioning parents. One surrogate mother
stated that
[the best part] was giving [the commissioning
parents] a daughter. It is a humbling experience.
When I gave [the baby] to [the commissioning
mother] she stated, “I’m holding my dream. Not
many people get to do that in their lifetime”.
And that to me summed it all up, I’d given her
dream.154
Few women regretted participating in surrogacy or
experienced distress on giving up the child after birth. Three of
the 19 women in Basilington’s study stated that they felt some
attachment to the child after birth. However, these feelings
were transitory for two of the women and, notably, both
experienced good relationships with the commissioning
parents. While one woman continued to feel distress two and a
half years after the birth, her distress was not over losing the
152
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child. Rather it was because the commissioning father was
disrespectful during the pregnancy and the birth, that she
doubted his suitability for parenthood, and her requests for
photographs and other information were ignored. No studies
reported any surrogate mothers who reached clinical levels of
depression after relinquishing the child.
Jadva et al. found that “all of the [34] women [who
were interviewed at least one year after relinquishing the child]
were happy with the decision reached about when to hand over
the baby and none has experienced any doubts or difficulties
whilst handing over the baby”.155 Thirty-two percent of the
surrogate mothers reported that they had had some difficulties
in the weeks following the handover. At the time of the
interview, two women still had some difficulties, with 94
percent expressing none at all. These findings are consistent
with those of Ciccarelli who interviewed women five to 10
years after serving as surrogates. The women interviewed said
that they were “quite satisfied” with their experiences.156 Other
longitudinal studies also showed that positive attitudes
remained stable over time.157 Teman concluded, following a
review of the research, that “almost all of the studies ... find, in
the end, that the overwhelming majority of surrogates do not
regret their decision and they even express feelings of pride
and accomplishment”.158
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As noted earlier, the most significant factor in
determining satisfaction is the relationship with the
commissioning parents during and after the pregnancy. The
research159 consistently shows that it is closeness with the
couple, not with the child, that is important. Blyth reports that
many surrogate mothers wanted some contact because they
believed that it would be better for the child to have a loose
connection to them.160 Jadva et al. reported that 18 percent of
the parties agreed prior to conception that the surrogate mother
would have no continuing involvement with the child after the
pregnancy. All others would have some kind of involvement.
94 percent of the surrogate mothers were happy with the level
of contact they had.
Surrogate mothers rarely refused to relinquish a child
after birth. Only two such refusals were noted in the interviewbased studies (Blyth and Basilington) reviewed for this paper.
The surrogate mother in the Basilington study had previously
relinquished a child without any difficulties but she refused to
relinquish the second child to different commissioning parents
because she had strong doubt about the father’s suitability for
parenthood. In 1999, van den Akker surveyed five clinics and
two agencies in Britain on the rate of refusals to relinquish by
the surrogate mother or refusal to accept by the commissioning
parent(s). Only one establishment reported any refusals to
relinquish.161 As noted earlier, there have been almost no
reported decisions in the last 20 years in Canada, the United
States, or Britain involving a dispute between surrogate
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mothers and the commissioning parents.162 The professional
team at a large clinic in England reported that they
“encountered no serious clinical, ethical or legal problems in
nine years”.163 Internet research failed to reveal any media
accounts in the last two decades of refusals to relinquish or
other disputes between parties to surrogacy arrangements other
than those already described. There are no reports of
commissioning parents refusing to accept a child, in any of the
empirical research reviewed for this paper, although there are
some accounts in other sources, such as the Baby Manji case in
India, which will be referred to later.
The empirical research demonstrates that surrogate
mothers are not subject to emotional volatility during
pregnancy and that they do not become pre-natally attached to
the fetus. Very few women express distress and when they do,
the distress is related to the relationship with the
commissioning parents, not over relinquishing the child. Only
in very few cases do surrogate mothers refuse to give up the
child. The lack of regret and distress expressed by women who
choose to be surrogates indicates that they make their decisions
with informed consent, an understanding of what the surrogacy
arrangement requires and a confidence that they can carry
through with their initial decision to participate in surrogacy.
The Health of Outcomes for Surrogate Mothers
Few studies by social scientists discuss the short- or
long-term health implications for the surrogate mother as a
consequence of the pregnancy or delivery; when they do, the
information on the medical issues is not detailed. Most
researchers ask open-ended questions about negative aspects of
162
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or regrets about participating in a surrogacy arrangement. In
most studies, the surrogate mothers did not report physical
effects in response to this question. An exception to this was
that three of 17 surrogate mothers in the Hohman and Hagan
study talked about their difficult births. However, all three said
that they were happy with the decision to be surrogate mothers
and, while relationships with the commissioning parents were
positive, they regretted having difficult births and, therefore,
would not be entering into another surrogacy arrangement.164
We reviewed a handful of studies by researchers based
in the medical sciences and they also show that the short- and
long-term health implications for surrogate mothers are not
heightened.165 Dan Reilly notes
[t]he literature regarding the medical risks
associated with surrogate pregnancy is limited to
a few case series. It remains to be determined if
the obstetric risks are the same as those for any
other pregnancy derived by in vitro fertilization
with the same number of fetuses. Most case
series report no increase in adverse events
related to surrogate pregnancy.166
Parkinson et al. reported that all 95 surrogate mothers in their
study were healthy at the beginning of the process and, noting
that they had all given birth to at least two children already,
found that the incidence of commonly experienced health
problems during their previous pregnancies was low (van den
Akker made the same observation167). Interestingly, surrogate
164
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mothers were three times more likely to be on bed rest for preterm labour than other pregnant women with the same
condition. This difference might suggest that surrogate
mothers are given the resources, including income replacement
and childcare, to take optimum care of themselves during the
pregnancy. One surrogate mother, out of 95, had a difficult
birth that resulted in a caesarean hysterectomy, but otherwise
no one was reported in any study to have experienced a
pregnancy or birth that resulted in serious short-term or
significant long-term health effects.
Parkinson et al. also found that five of 95 British
surrogate mothers experienced “mild transient postpartum
‘maternal blues’, but that no cases of documented neurotic
postpartum depression occurred in IVF-surrogates”.168 This
finding is consistent with other studies. For example, none of
the women in the Jadva et al. study ever had a score above the
cut-off indicated for clinical depression. This includes the two
of the 34 surrogate mothers who were still expressing difficulty
with the decision to relinquish the child one year after birth.
Surprisingly, 20 percent (of the 61) surrogate mothers in van
den Akker’s longitudinal study self-reported post-natal
depression in their previous pregnancies in an interview held
after they had decided to enter a surrogacy arrangement, but
before becoming pregnant. Van den Akker comments that
“clearly counseling and screening was not sufficiently
adequate”.169 However, at a second interview, held six months
after delivery, none of the surrogate mothers reported postnatal depression.
The decision to become pregnant, either to give birth to
a child that one will raise or to give to someone else to raise,
168
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carries with it an acceptance of emotional and physical risks.
Because almost all the women who have been surrogate
mothers had given birth prior to making this decision, they
already had a good idea of what the specific risks were for
them. It is not surprising, therefore, that surrogate mothers
report few complications during the pregnancy, delivery and
post-delivery. While risk cannot be avoided altogether, the
risks can be minimized if potential surrogate mothers have
access to good screening for mental and physical issues prior to
conception and the resources to take good care of themselves
during the pregnancy.
The Expectations of Children in Surrogate Arrangements
It has been argued that surrogacy may be bad for children
because they may be angry at the women who abandoned them
or that commissioning parents may be over-protective of the
children or have unrealistic expectations if they have had to
pay a high price for them.170 Concerns were expressed that
commissioning parents would refuse to accept the child, or to
pay the surrogate mother, if the child was disabled. The
RCNRT stated that “preconception arrangements will alter
society’s understanding of parenthood, family and parental
responsibilities, reducing parenthood to a transaction ... with
the child as the product of the deal”.171
A 2004 literature review concludes that there are “few,
if any, psychological differences between children conceived
by [assisted reproductive technologies] and those conceived
naturally with regard to emotions, behaviour, the presence of
psychological disorders or their perceptions of the quality of
170
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family relationships”.172 In a 2006 study, Sandra Golombok et
al. studied the relationship between the children and their
families at the time of the child’s third birthday. Sixty-seven
families with a child conceived through heterosexual
intercourse between the parents were compared with 34
surrogacy families, 41 assisted insemination families and 41
oocyte donation families. They found higher levels of warmth
and interaction between the assisted reproduction families than
in other families. They concluded that “it appears that the
absence of a genetic and/or gestational link between parents
and their child does not have a negative impact on parent-child
relationships or the psychological well-being of mother, father
or children at age 3”.173
Guichon refers to on-line blogs where some now-adult
offspring of surrogacy arrangements are expressing
unhappiness because they perceive that they were rejected or
abandoned by their surrogate mother.174 On the other hand, as
soon as she turned 18, Baby M initiated legal proceedings to
allow her commissioning mother to adopt her and to terminate
any legal rights her surrogate mother might have had. She
stated that she was happy with her family.175 No empirical
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studies have been conducted on the experiences of now–adult
children born of surrogacy arrangements.
van den Akker states that “to date, the author is not
aware of any disabled surrogate births, but this is a possibility
in the future”.176 Based on a survey of seven clinics and
agencies involved in surrogacy, she also reports that no
commissioning parents have refused to take a child.177 The
Parkinson et al. review (which included a review of the
medical files of 95 surrogate mothers and included birth
details) mentions that there was testing for fetal anomalies but
is silent on whether there were any abortions. However, there
were five multi-fetal reductions where three sets of quads and
two sets of triplets were each reduced to twins. There were no
fetal reductions during the last three years of a nine year study
period (1989-97), because the clinic reduced the number of
embryos it would implant. This review notes that four children
of the 128 born had minor disabilities: two with cysts, one
with a cleft palate, and one with duodenal atresia. As noted
earlier, no study reviewed for this paper indicated that any
commissioning parents had rejected the children born to a
surrogate mother.
While the empirical research is limited, it does not
support the theory that commissioning parents will be overprotective of their children or have unrealistic expectations of
them. There is no evidence of commissioning parents rejecting
children who do not meet their expectations. Changing societal
norms on what it means to be a parent are not inherently
undesirable.
Indeed these norms have been altered
significantly in the last 50 years to meet new social conditions.
Canadian laws do not require that parents have a genetic
connection to a child to be legally recognized as a parent.
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Adoptions have always been accepted in Canada and
anonymous sperm donor assistance has been used by
heterosexual couples for half a century; these methods of
family formation are now more widely available to single
people and same-sex couples. More recently, other nongenetic parent-child relationships have been recognized, such
as de facto parenting and birth registrations in the name of two
women or more than two people as parents where this
arrangement is consistent with the intention of the registrants at
the time of conception. It is hard to follow the argument that
pre-conception agreements reduce parenthood to a transaction.
That “transaction” is but the first step to becoming a parent,
with most of the work of “family and parental responsibilities”
yet to come. Thus, neither altered social understandings nor
the fact of a transaction are convincing arguments against
surrogacy arrangements.
The Motivations of Commissioning Parents
Some are concerned that commercial surrogacy commodifies
women’s reproductive capacities because it allows wealthy
women to buy their way out of the burden of having to be
pregnant. The influential Warnock Report in England (1984)
and other reports178 voiced strong concerns that women would
seek surrogacy mothers for convenience. Health Canada stated
in a consultation paper on permissible expenses for surrogates
that
... the commercialization of the human
reproductive capacity is not in keeping with
178
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Canadian values. Canadians feel strongly that
human life is a gift that should not be bought
and sold, or treated like a consumer commodity.
A guiding principle of the AHR Act is to prevent
trade in the reproductive capabilities of women
and men.179
The British Medical Association180 and Human Fertilization
and Embryology Act both stress that surrogate mothers should
only be available when the commissioning mother cannot carry
or it is highly undesirable for her to carry a fetus to term. The
research demonstrates that there is no evidence that
commissioning mothers are seeking surrogacy to avoid the
inconvenience, physical effects or career impacts of their own
pregnancy.181 Rather, it shows that all commissioning mothers
were infertile, unable to carry a fetus to term, or had a serious
medical conditions that makes pregnancy dangerous for them.
SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FEMINIST THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The empirical research focusing on surrogate mothers in
Britain and the United States does not support concerns that
they are being exploited by these arrangements, that they
cannot give meaningful consent to participating, or that the
arrangements commodify women or children. Money is a
motivator for some participants, but for most, the decision to
participate comes out of a desire to help a childless couple, to
do something unusual or to make a unique contribution. Of
course, there are women disappointed by the process and there
179

Health Canada, “Reimbursement of Expenses under the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act: Public Consultation Paper” (no date),
online at: www.hc-sc.gc.ca.

180

British Medical Association, supra note 140.

181

Edelmann, supra note 88 at 127.

Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale

81

are situations in which women are treated poorly by agencies
or commissioning parents. But, overwhelmingly, the research
demonstrates that the women who become surrogate mothers
go into the process on their own initiative, with a strong sense
of what it is that they are committing to and that they rarely
regret having been a surrogate mother. They have satisfying
relationships with the commissioning parents during the
pregnancy and after the delivery. Situations in the last two
decades where surrogate mothers refuse to relinquish children
are extremely rare, as are situations where commissioning
parents refuse to accept them. Limited research indicates that
the children born of these arrangements are doing well.
Problems arise when women do not have access to
information and advice before making the decision to
participate in a surrogacy arrangement and when they cannot
engage as active agents in the choice of commissioning
parents. While the research is limited, this situation may
exacerbated in Canada where the state of surrogacy law inhibits
women who are considering becoming involved in surrogacy
from getting the information that they need. Commercial
surrogacy arrangements are being made in Canada between
both Canadian residents and non-residents in spite of the
prohibition and, all signs indicate that the practice of using
surrogacy arrangements will continue to grow. In light of these
findings, Canadian governments should replace a criminal
prohibition against commercial surrogacy arrangements with a
regulatory regime that minimizes the potential for the
exploitation and commodification of surrogates and children.
SURROGACY ARRANGMENTS ACROSS BORDERS
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in detail,
we must note that there is some anecdotal evidence that
Canadian residents are commissioning women in other
countries, notably India and the United States, to be surrogate
mothers because it is easier or cheaper to find surrogate
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mothers in those countries. As well, Canadian commissioning
parents engage American women as surrogates (and pay
commercial rate fees) but arrange for the women to come to
Canada to give birth, thereby saving on medical expenses and
avoiding issues related to citizenship and the immediate need
for a passport for the child. In spite of the criminal prohibition
on commercial surrogacy, non-Canadians have commissioned
Canadian surrogate mothers, perhaps because they know that
the law is not being enforced here and to save on medical
expenses.182
Surrogacy contracts in India are virtually unregulated.
Media accounts and some journalists183 suggest that Indian
women are being exploited and abused, including being subject
to severe constraints on liberty during the pregnancy. Some
women are only paid after they give birth and only if the
commissioning parents agree to accept the child. According to
some accounts, children have been rejected by commissioning
parents, who can renege on these contracts with impunity.
Nolan for instance, reports,
“[t]hese surrogate mothers are just being kept
there like baby factories”, said Nandita Rao, a
lawyer pushing for regulation of the fertility
industry. “The women are just sitting there
producing a child with no rights to that child and
182
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Subramanian, “Wombs for Rent” Maclean’s (2 July 2007), online:
Macleans.ca <www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=20070702_1070
62_107062>. Rengachary Smerdon, supra note 13 and Ruparelia,
supra note 64.
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no rights on their health--the contract says that if
you don’t produce the child, you don’t get the
money—so they go on with the pregnancy no
matter what [the risk] and there is no maximum
number of times they can do this. In India,
which is so fiercely patriarchal, many are using
their daughters as baby-churning factories”.184
Since the early 2000s, India has actively developed its
medical tourism industry. The reproductive portion of this
market is valued at over $450 million (U.S.) per year and is
expected to increase.185 In 2005, the Indian Council for
Medical Research (ICMR) published the non-binding
“National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision &
Regulation of ART Clinics in India”. These guidelines,
amongst other regulations, support commercial surrogacy,
permit gestational surrogacy only and state that the birth
certificate should be in the genetic parents’ names.186 ICMR
released a draft of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies
(Regulation) Bill (2008) for public comment and it received
first reading in December, 2008.187 This bill was influenced by
the Baby Manji (2008) case where a child born to a surrogate
mother was left in legal limbo when her genetic parents
divorced before her birth.188 The commissioning father wanted
184
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to adopt but Indian law would not allow a single father to
adopt. Neither the surrogate mother nor the commissioning
mother wanted the child. The father could not take the baby
home to Japan because the Japanese embassy said she needed
Indian travel documents because she was born in India.
However, in India, a child’s travel documents are linked to the
mother so the baby had none. Eventually, the paternal
grandmother adopted the child. She was finally issued a
“certificate of identity” (which are given to people who are
stateless or cannot get passports from their home country)
which allowed the father to apply for a Japanese visa to bring
the child to Japan. 189
The 2008 bill, as with the guidelines, only regulates
gestational surrogacy and prohibits surrogate mothers from
having a genetic link to the child.190 Among other things, this
bill makes surrogacy agreements enforceable contracts in
which the surrogate mother renounces all parental rights; it
requires surrogate mothers are required to be between the ages
of 21 and 45 and participating women are limited to a
maximum of three pregnancies. The commissioning parents’
names would be on the birth certificate from the time of birth
and the child would be considered their child even if they
divorce. They would be required to pay all the surrogate’s
costs, have proof that they can take the child out of India and
appoint a local guardian to care for the surrogate.191
Given the heightened potential for exploitation of
surrogate mothers involved in international surrogacy
arrangements, consideration should be given to prohibiting
189
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Canadian residents from engaging non-resident surrogate
mothers and possibly prohibiting non-residents from engaging
resident surrogate mothers unless Canada has entered into
reciprocal protocols with these countries.
THE REGULATORY REGIME ON SURROGACY IN
CANADA – WHAT IT SHOULD LOOK LIKE
The federal government’s authority to enact the AHRA can only
be founded in the criminal law power. Otherwise, its
jurisdiction to make laws related to surrogacy must be ancillary
to another power, such as the citizenship of a child born to
surrogacy participants where one of them is not a Canadian
resident. The criminal law power requires that, in purpose and
effect, the law prohibits highly undesirable activities and
attaches penal consequences to those who engage in such
activities. Perforce, it is a blunt instrument that is not well
suited to the governance of complex human interactions.
Canadian law prohibits parties to a surrogacy arrangement or
any third parties from exchanging any money unless it is for
payment of expenses, as set out in the regulations. As no
regulations have been made in the five years since the act
passed, even the payment of expenses could attract criminal
liability.
Nonetheless, Canadian residents are making
surrogacy arrangements. The empirical evidence in Britain and
the United States indicates that the participants’ experiences,
motives, personal characteristics, circumstances, and ability to
develop relationships—and not whether money changes
hands—are the determinants of satisfaction with surrogacy
arrangements. It also establishes that most participants are
satisfied with the process. By failing to accommodate the
highly individualistic and inter-personal nature of surrogacy
arrangements, the current criminal law regime simultaneously
denies women personal autonomy and exacerbates the potential
for their exploitation.
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The primary goal of a legal regime governing
surrogacy arrangements must be to ensure both that women
have the ability to make an informed decision to become a
surrogate mother and the power to exercise that capacity
properly, including the ability to resist pressure to participate in
surrogacy or be controlled by others during the pregnancy.
Only the provinces have the comprehensive ability to pass laws
that can take into account the complexity of surrogacy
arrangements and therefore the federal AHRA should be
replaced, or at least supplemented, by192 provincial regulatory
regimes. As the needs of (potential) surrogate mothers are the
same regardless of the kind of surrogacy, the regime should
govern traditional, gestational, commercial and gratuitous
surrogacy arrangements and include any arrangement where
either the surrogate mother or the commissioning parent(s) are
Canadian residents.
A regulatory regime must ensure that all parties
interested in participating in surrogacy are screened for
physical, financial, and emotional vulnerabilities before any
other steps are taken. In order to have sufficient knowledge of
the physical and emotional risks they face during a pregnancy
and after birth, only women who have given birth (following
low risk pregnancies and deliveries), have completed their
families, and are confident of their ability to be a surrogate
192
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mother should participate. Women whose sole reason for
participating is to overcome financial hardship or those who
live with serious mental health issues, such as a history of postnatal depression or fragile personalities, should not be accepted
as surrogate mothers, because the potential for exploitation or
other adverse consequences is too significant. The interest in
participating in surrogacy usually comes from the potential
surrogate mother herself. Screeners need to be alert to the
possibility that a woman might be under pressure from others
to participate and, especially where the initial idea did not
come from the potential surrogate mother, they should take
special care to determine if there is pressure on her to
participate. Commissioning parents should be screened to
ensure that they have the financial wherewithal to participate in
a surrogacy arrangement and, where a couple is involved, to
ensure that both members are in agreement that surrogacy is
something that they want to try. The reasons for seeking
surrogacy should be explored as surrogacy simply for their
convenience should not be encouraged. While there is no
evidence to support the concern that surrogacy will lead to
baby-selling, the screener could also determine if this was, in
fact, the commissioning parents’ intention.
If the
commissioning parents are friends or family of the potential
surrogate mother, they may also provide information to
screeners on whether she is being pressured to participate.
The empirical evidence clearly establishes that formal
and informal pre-conception relationships building between the
potential surrogate mothers and commissioning parents are key
to the success of the arrangements. All parties should receive
separate advice and counselling on issues that might arise
during the pregnancy, delivery, and after the birth, including
medical issues, conduct and diet, insurance, compensation,
expenses, place of birth, exchange of the child, parentage, and
post-birth contact. The objective of such counselling include
discussing specific anxieties, facilitating decision-making, and
ensuring that issues are identified and resolved at an early
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stage.193 Only after the relationship is established are the
parties ready to come to specific mutual understandings about
how the process should unfold if the surrogate mother becomes
pregnant. As most surrogate pregnancies are achieved at
fertility clinics, the clinics could be required to ensure that
parties are screened and have received separate and
independent and then joint counselling and advice on
formulating their arrangement before attempting any
fertilization or implantation procedures.
The Canadian Bar Association has recommended that
the expense of obtaining legal advice should be a
compensatable expense for surrogate mothers and they should
be encouraged to obtain independent legal advice prior to
entering into any form of a surrogacy contract.194 Lawyers are
also well placed to handle financial aspects of the
arrangements, particularly if trust funds are created from which
to pay compensation and expenses. Care must be taken to
ensure against creating an erroneous impression that surrogacy
arrangement frameworks may be more contract-like and
therefore enforceable if they are prepared by lawyers.
Independent legal advice is not a substitute for
screening or separate and joint counselling.
The preconception process involves not only identifying potentially
contentious issues, but also requires more skill in counselling
and relationship building than most lawyers have. The parties
are likely to be best served by an agency that provides
screening, facilitates pre-conception relationship building, and
assists in issue identification and decision-making.
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While the surrogate mother’s personal autonomy
during the pregnancy is well protected by the common law, it
might be instructive to the parties and others involved in the
pregnancy, such as health care workers, to set this out
explicitly in statute law and to require that certain standard
terms be replicated in all surrogacy arrangement frameworks.
Statutory terms protecting the surrogate mother’s autonomy
could include the surrogate mother’s sole ability to make
medical decisions, protection of personal privacy, the ability to
withdraw information waivers, and the unenforceability of
terms concerning diet and conduct. Consideration should be
given to having minimum rates of compensation for surrogacy
(including partial payments in the event of a miscarriage),
unless the arrangement is intended to be gratuitous, and the
mandatory use of trust accounts to ensure that funds are
available and that compensation and expenses are paid in a
timely way. As well, consideration should also be given to
whether the surrogate mother should have the right to reverse
her decision to relinquish the child within a short period after
giving birth regardless of the nature of the surrogacy or that she
cannot be asked to sign a relinquishment immediately after
birth. Such provisions are common in adoption statutes. 195
While almost no surrogate mothers have refused to relinquish,
such a provision may help to ensure that her autonomy is fully
protected, that she is well treated during the pregnancy, and
that her consent is meaningfully given.
State-insured health care for Canadian residents has
resulted in non-Canadian residents seeking Canadian surrogate
mothers because this allows them to avoid having to pay
195
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medical expenses related to the pregnancy, delivery, and perinatal care. Commissioning parents sometimes, perhaps often,
seek Canadian surrogate mothers instead of Americans because
surrogacy medical insurance in the United States costs in
excess of $25,000 (for a singleton) and $40,000 (for twins).
While it would appear these expenses must be paid for under
provincial healthcare regimes because the services are being
provided directly to Canadian residents, serious consideration
should be given to requiring non-resident commissioning
parents to pay such costs. This burden seems unreasonable for
Canadian taxpayers to assume. As such expenses could easily
exceed $50,000, this issue demands attention, especially as
many surrogate pregnancies result in the pre-term birth of
twins.
Only four provinces have specific laws concerning
registration of births to surrogate mothers or on parentage;
none have clear statutory procedural laws to expedite the
process. Therefore, the birth will probably be registered in the
surrogate mother’s name alone or together with either the name
of her husband (who is presumptively the father) or in the name
of the commissioning father. The commissioning parent(s)
then adopt the child or seek a parentage declaration. As noted
earlier, birth registration, parentage and adoption issues
currently are decided by Canadian judges in most jurisdictions
on an ad hoc basis.196 In the United States and Canada this
situation leads to a kind of forum shopping whereby
commissioning parents seek to have the children born in a
favourable jurisdiction (for example, Ohio, where by statute
only genetic parents are named on a birth certificate) or, at
least one with a more established and expedited process (for
example, British Columbia, which permits pre-birth motions
regarding birth registrations). Surrogate mothers are being
196
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asked to relocate just before they give birth. This situation can
tear surrogate mothers from their families and other supports,
such as established relationships with health care providers at
the time when they are most needed. Birth registration and
parentage laws (including procedural laws) should be clarified
across Canada.
Surrogate mothers will be best protected if the laws of
the province where they usually reside irrevocably govern both
parentage and the contract-like aspects of the surrogacy
arrangement. This would discourage forum shopping and help
ensure that she gives birth at home. Birth registration laws of
the place where the birth occurs obviously apply to registration,
although the federal government should clarify the citizenship
status of children born when either the surrogate mother or the
commissioning parents are not residents of Canada.
Canada has reciprocal arrangements with many
countries concerning international adoptions to ensure that
Canadians are not involved in baby-selling and other
exploitative practices. It also has laws with extra-territorial
effect, such as laws prohibiting Canadian residents from
engaging in exploitative sexual activities with minors while
abroad. There is evidence, albeit limited, that surrogate
mothers in some countries are at significant risk of being
exploited. Consideration should be given to barring Canadian
residents from entering surrogacy arrangements with nonresidents, either as potential surrogate mothers or
commissioning parent(s), unless Canada has established a
reciprocal arrangement with the non-residents’ countries. This
end can be accomplished, as it now is with laws relating to
international adoptions, through criminal law sanctions and
laws related to citizenship and residency status for children
born to surrogate mothers where the commissioning parents are
Canadian residents. The form of reciprocal arrangements could
be similar to those used to regulate and facilitate international
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adoptions197 and would ensure that all surrogacy arrangements
protect surrogate mothers’ autonomy and ability to consent, set
standards regarding compensation and expenses and regularize
birth registration, parentage and citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The stories told by American and British women who have
agreed to be surrogate mothers are quite different from the
cautionary tale told by Atwood’s handmaid and they indicate
that the experience of Marybeth Whitehead, the surrogate
mother in the Baby M case, is the exception not the norm. The
empirical research demonstrates that concerns that commercial
surrogacy will lead to commodification and exploitation and
that women cannot give meaningful consent to such
arrangements, have not been realized in those countries.
Because participation in surrogacy in Canada is a criminal
offense, the stories of Canadian participants are, like the stories
of Atwood’s handmaids, only told in the whispers of mediated
forums or confidential conversations. The empirical research
supports the view that women in Canada should not be denied
the right to exercise agency over their own bodies, in particular
their reproductive autonomy, but rather they should be legally
able to enter into surrogacy arrangements with commissioning
parents.
Laws regulating surrogacy arrangements will be more
effective than an outright or partial ban on surrogacy in
ensuring that women who agree to act as either gratuitous or
commercial surrogate mothers are not exploited. Additionally,
by having a home-made solution, we may reduce our
197
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contribution to the exploitation of women in other countries,
where the social and economic status of women is not
comparable to that of most Canadian women and the statutory
regulatory regime is less likely to control exploitative practices.

